College of William & Mary Law School

William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository
Faculty Publications

Faculty and Deans

2009

Why the United States Supreme Court Got Some
[but not a lot] of the Sixth Amendment Right to
Counsel Analysis Right
Paul Marcus
William & Mary Law School, pxmarc@wm.edu

Repository Citation
Marcus, Paul, "Why the United States Supreme Court Got Some [but not a lot] of the Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel Analysis
Right" (2009). Faculty Publications. 62.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs/62

Copyright c 2009 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs

WHY THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
GOT SOME (BUT NOT A LOT) OF
THE SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO COUNSEL
ANALYSIS RIGHT
PAULMARCUS 1

The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did
not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and
educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of law....
He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings
against him. Without it, though he be not guilry, he faces the danger of
conviction because he does not know how to establish his innocence.2
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the past forty-five years, the United States Supreme Court has
firmly established the right to lawyers for poor people in criminal cases.
The right, arising under the Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, extends beyond trials, and includes assistance in addition to
lawyers for indigent defendants. The right to a lawyer is seen as central to
our system of criminal justice. At the same time, the Justices' rulings here
have been subject to sharp criticism in a host of areas relating to the stages
of the proceedings to which the right applies, the failure to define
indigency, and the refusal to monitor seriously the competency of lawyers
in such cases.
In this article, I will applaud the reach of some of the Court's
decisions, but also second the critics who have questioned the limits of
other decisions. In particular, I will look to the unfortunate determination
that indigent criminal defendants are not entitled to the assistance of
counsel in all prosecutions. 3 First, though, an overview of how far we have
come with the right to counsel in criminal cases, in a relatively short period
of time.
II. AN OVERVIEW OF THE COURT'S COUNSEL DECISIONS
In its landmark 1963 decision of Gideon v. Wainwright, 4 the Supreme
Court held that the 6th Amendment's right to appointed counsel extended
to indigent criminal defendants in state courts. 5 Despite its justly
celebrated sweeping language and the genuine revolution it created in the
criminal justice system, Gideon left numerous vital questions unanswered. 6
3. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979).
4. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
.5. !d. at 344-45.
6. See infra Part IV.
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Almost a half century later, the Supreme Court continues to grapple with
defining the scope and application of the 6th Amendment right to counsel. 7
A.

GIDEON V. WAINWRIGHT

The Justices in Gideon unanimously incorporated against the states
the 6th Amendment's right to counsel for indigent defendants.8 Facing a
felony charge, Gideon appeared in court without funds and without a
lawyer, and requested that the judge appoint counsel on his behalf. 9 The
judge denied the request, as Florida only allowed the appointment of
counsel in capital cases. 10 While "Gideon conducted his defense about as
well as could be expected from a layman," 11 he was found guilty and
sentenced to five years imprisonment. 12
Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the 6th Amendment right
to counsel constituted a fundamental right, and extended that right to
Gideon and fellow indigent defendants in state criminal proceedings. 13 In
its opinion, authored by Justice Hugo Black, the Court explicitly overruled
Betts v. Brady, 14 a decision in which Justice Black had strongly dissented. 15
Betts had held that the 6th Amendment right to counsel applied only to
federal trials, with the notion that "appointment of counsel is not a
fundamental right, essential to a fair trial." 16 The Betts Court had
concluded that neither due process nor the 14th Amendment required the
states to provide the assistance of defense counsel to indigent defendants
generally. 17 It was needed only in particular cases where special
circumstances might be present. 18 In sharp contrast to this analysis, Justice
Black, in dissent, embraced the earlier Powell v. Alabama,19 which had
declared that the right to the aid of counsel is of this fundamental
character. 20 In Powell, a shockingly unfair capital case, the Court ruled
that due process may require the appointment of counsel for certain

7. See infra Part IV.
8. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 342-43,352.
9. !d. at 336-37.
10. !d. at337.
11. !d.
12. /d.
13. !d. at 345.
14. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
15. !d. at 474 (Black, J., dissenting).
16. /d. at 471.
17. /d.
18. See Gideon, 372 U.S. at 347.
19. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
20. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 342-43.
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indigent defendants.21
Emphasizing Powell, and rejecting Betts as
precedent, the Court in Gideon found the right to counsel in state as well as
federal cases to be "fundamental and essential to a fair trial. •>22
Not only these precedents [Powell v. Alabama] but also reason and
reflection require us to recognize that in our adversary system of
criminal justice, any person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a
lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for
him. This seems to be an obvious truth.2 3

Despite the sweeping language of Justice Black to grant a
fundamental right to counsel for indigent defendants, the Gideon holding is
actually narrow; it left numerous questions unanswered. Indeed, it soon
became evident that Gideon did not actually extend the right to counsel to
any indigent criminal defendant "haled into court."
B.

THE ACTUAL IMPRISONMENT STANDARD

Because Gideon v. Wainwright failed to specify what types of
prosecutions would qualify for appointed counsel, a decade later, the
Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether the 6th Amendment right to
counsel extended only to felony cases. In Argersinger v. Hamlin/4 the
indigent defendant was denied an appointed lawyer, convicted of carrying a
concealed weapon, and sentenced to ninety days in jail. 25 He then brought
a habeas corpus action alleging that he was unconstitutionally deprived of
the right to counsel at his trial. 26 The Florida Supreme Court ruled that the
right to counsel only extended to non-petty offenses imposing more than
six months imprisonmentY The Supreme Court of the United States
disagreed, deciding that absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no
defendant may be imprisoned for any offense, whether petty, misdemeanor,
21. The case involved the so-called Scottsboro Boys. As discussed by the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals:
In April 1931, nine black youths were accused of raping two young white women
while riding a freight train between Chattanooga, Tennessee, and Huntsville,
Alabama. The case was widely discussed in the local, national, and foreign press.
The youths were quickly tried in Scottsboro, Alabama, and all were found guilty and
sentenced to death.
Street v. National Broadcasting Co., 645 F.2d 1227, 1229 (6th Cir. 1981). Street itself is a most
interesting case, involving an unsuccessful defamation action brought years later by one of the
alleged victims in the original rape trial. !d. The suit was against NBC for making a movie
dramatizing the courage of one of the trial judges in the initial case. !d.
22. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344.
23 . !d.
24. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
25. !d. at 26.
26. /d.
27. ld. at 26-27.
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or felony, without representation by counsel at trial. 28 Justice Douglas,
writing for the majority, distinguished the six-month nummum
imprisonment standard governing the 6th Amendment right to a jury trial
from the standard to be used with the 6th Amendment right to counsel. 29
Justice Douglas acknowledged that both Gideon and Powell involved
felonies, but also that both cases "suggest that there are certain fundamental
rights applicable to all such criminal prosecutions," in order to guarantee a
fair trial "where an accused is deprived of his liberty. "30 By extending the
right to counsel to all prosecutions resulting in imprisonment, the Court
abandoned the traditional distinction between felonies and misdemeanors,
in favor of a standard focusing on actual deprivation of liberty. 31
Justice Powell, concurring in the result, agreed with the majority's
rejection of the felony misdemeanor distinction, but argued that the Court's
rule was too rigid. 32 He advocated a more flexible due process principle of
fundamental fairness in determining the applicability of the right to
counsel. n
He asserted that many consequences of even minor
misdemeanor convictions are not petty, and that col1ateral, non-punitive
consequences may even be more serious for the defendant than "a brief
stay in jail."34 Accordingly, Justice Powell concluded that, "When the
deprivation of property rights and interest is of sufficient consequence,
denying the assistance of counsel to indigents who are incapable of
defending themselves is a denial of due process."35
Although it resolved the issue of whether the right to counsel applied
only to felonies, Argersinger itself required further clarification as it
declined to decide whether the right to counsel attaches if there is not actual
imprisonment but only the possibility of it. 36 A divided Supreme Court in
Scott v. Illinois,31 narrowed the scope of Argersinger. It declared
Argersinger meant no more than what it held: that no indigent defendant
may be sentenced to imprisonment without the state granting the right to
28. ld. at 37.
29. ld. at 26, 29.
30. Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 32-34.
31. Id. at 37- 38.
32. !d. at 47. (Powell, J., concurring).
33. ld.
34. /d. at 48. On this point, he was correct. See discussion infra Part V.B.4.
35. Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 48 (Powell, J., concurring). Powell's view was that, on a caseby-case basis, judges must decide whether the matter was one of "sufficient consequence." Id.
He suggested that three factors be weighed in determining whether appointed counsel is required
for a fair trial: the complexity of the charged offense, the probable sentence if convicted, and
case-specific factual circumstances. /d. at 64.
36. ld. at 51.

37. Scott v. Hlinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979).
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assistance of appointed counsel. 3s The Court clarified Argersinger's
application by ruling that the 6th Amendment right to counsel applies only
if the defendant is actually sentenced to imprisonment, and not merely
facing possible imprisonment. 39 The defendant in Scott could have
received a sentence of up to one year in jail, but he was ultimately only
fined $50. 40 Because he was not ordered to be imprisoned, the Court found
that the defendant was not constitutionally entitled to appointed counsel.41
The opinion stressed the Argersinger finding that incarceration is a
uniquely severe sanction warranting appointed counsel.42 It discussed the
frequent references to cases involving deprivation of liberty and to
prosecutions that "'actually lead to imprisonment even for a brief
period. "'43
In his concurring opinion, Justice Powell reiterated the concerns he
first expressed in his Argersinger concurrence, including his misgivings
about conviction consequences beyond imprisonment and his preference
for a more flexible due process standard.44 Justice Brennan, writing for the
dissent, decried the plurality's actual imprisonment standard that deprived
many defendants of the right to appointed counsel. 45 Justice Brennan
emphasized the language of the 6th Amendment itself, which appears to
apply the right to counsel "in all criminal prosecutions."46 He advocated
the adoption of the broader authorized imprisonment standard.4 7
C. TYPE OF PROCEEDING

In addition to defining the types of crimes and punishments triggering
the 6th Amendment nght to counsel, the Supreme Court addressed the
types of proceedings that require an appointed lawyer. Despite the Gideon38. Id. at 373-74.
39. ld. at 373.
40. Id. at 375.
41. Id. at 373-74.
42. !d. at 372-73.
43 . Scott, 440 U.S. at 373 ("[T]ne central premise of Argersinger- that actual imprisonment
is a penalty different in kind from fmcs or the mere threat of imprisonment-is eminently sound

and warrants adoption of actual imprisonment as the line defining the constitutional right to
appointment of counsel."); see also Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 658 (2002) (extending the
Argersinger-Scott actual imprisonment standard to an activated suspended sentence). Because a
suspended sentence may result in imprisonment (i.e. , an actual deprivation of liberty that may be
triggered in the future if certain conditions are not met), such a sentence cannot be imposed if the
indigent defendant was not offered counsel at trial. Id.
44. Scott, 440 U.S. at 375 {Powell, J., concurring) ..
45. Id. at 382 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
46. Id.
47.

Jd.
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era trend toward broadening the 6th Amendment right to counsel, the Court
later restricted the type of proceedings covered by the right.48 In one
principal case, a divided Supreme Court held that there is no right to
counsel during a pre-indictment police lineup. 49 According to Justice
Stewart's plurality opinion, the right attaches only when adversary judicial
proceedings have been formally initiated against the defendant. 50 He wrote
that the Court' s seminal right to counsel cases had all addressed cases
where such proceedings had already commenced, "whether by way of
formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or
arraignrnent."51 Justice Stewart believed that attaching the right to counsel
upon the commencement of adversary judicial proceedings was consistent
with, and required by, the "criminal prosecutions" language of the Sixth
Amendment itself. 52
The following year, in United States v. Ash, 53 the Supreme Court
determined that the 6th Amendment right to counsel did not attach during a
witness' post-indictment photo identification of the defendant. 54 The Court
found that although such a photo identification may occur after adversary
judicial proceedings had commenced, it is neither a critical stage of the
prosecution nor confrontational, since the defendant is not even present. 55
The right is limited to critical, trial-like confrontations, and witness photo
identifications in the defendant's absence fail to meet that threshold .56
48. See Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682,686 (1972).
49. /d. at 690. But see United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 23fr37 (1967) (holding the
opposite for such proceedings post-indictment). The Supreme Court interpreted the holding of
United States v. Wade by explaining that:
We ... [in United States v. Wade} held that a post-indictment pretrial lineup at which
the accused is exhibited to identifying witnesses is a critical stage of the criminal
prosecution; that police conduct of such a lineup without notice to and in the absence
of his counsel denies the accused his Sixth Amendment right to counsel and calls in
question the admissibility at trial of the in-court identifications of the accused by
witnesses who attended the lineup.
Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 272 (1967).
50. Kirby, 406 U.S. at 688.
51. /d. at 689 (seemingly breaking with earlier cases which had emphasi~ed the nature of the
identification procedure rather than the stage of the proceeding); see Wade, 388 U.S. at 229-32;
see also Kirby, 406 U.S. at 699 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (discussing post-arrest identifications as
a crucial stage of the proceedings for which counsel is necessary for a fair prosecution).
52. Kirby, 406 U.S. at 690; see also Massiah v . United States, 377 U.S. 201, 206 (1964)
(demonstrating the consistency of this view, where Justice Stewart found the defendant's right to
counsel was violated when, after indictment, defendant who was not in custody was informally
questioned by undercover agent).
53. United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300 (1973).
54. ld at 30~1.
55. /d. at 325 (citing United States ex rei. Reed v. Anderson, 461 F.2d 739, 745 (1972)).
56. !d. at 321. Justice Brennan again dissented, contending that pretrial lineups and
photographic displays alike are critical stages of the prosecution demanding the assistance of
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EXPERTS

While the Argersinger-Scott and Kirby-Ash line of cases is notable for
restricting the scope of the 6th Amendment right to counsel, in one
important area, the Court significantly expanded protections given to the
accused. Ake v. Oklahoma 57 utilized the Court's right to counsel analysis to
find a parallel right to the appointment of experts for indigent defendants.5 8
The Court found there that in a capital case, an indigent defendant holds a
constitutional right to a state-provided psychiatric evaluation and assistance
when essential to prepare an effective defense based on his mental
condition. 59 Focusing on the 14th Amendment's due process guarantee of
fundamental fairness, Justice Marshall's opinion is reminiscent of the
Court's earlier seminal right to counsel cases. 60 The due process analysis in
Ake provides a basis for extending rights to assistance besides counsel,
when an indigent defendant has made an adequate showing that such stateprovided assistance is needed for an effective defense. 61
E.

MORE PROTECTION GIVEN IN SOME PLACES

While the United States Supreme Court has not been overly generous
in granting counsel in cases in which imprisonment is not ultimately
ordered,62 many states go beyond the federal constitutional requirement.
Instead of looking to actual imprisonment [or suspended sentences], 63 they

counsel. !d. at 344. Reiterating his differing interpretation of Wade and objections to the Court's
distinctions, Justice Brennan argued that the dangers of an uncounseled photo identification are
equal to-or even greater than-the dangers of an uncounseled lineup. !d. at332-33.
57. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
58. ld. at 86-87.
59. Id. at 83.
60. Jd. at 76.
61. Jd. at 83. The cases are somewhat mixed across the nation as to the showing defendants
must make in order to receive expert assistance at trial in such cases. Compare State v. Bridges,
385 S.E.2d 337, 339 (N.C. 1989), with Yohey v. Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 227 (5th Cir. 1993). In
the former, the court reversed the conviction after the trial judge would not give a fingerprint
expert when fingerprints were important in a murder prosecution. Bridges, 385 S.E.2d at 339. In
the latter, the appeals court held that an expert should only be appointed "if the evidence is both
'critical to the conviction and subject to varying expert opinion.'" Collins, 985 F.2d at 227.
62. See supra notes 37--47 and accompanying text. Few issues surrounding the start of the
process remain, as both preliminary hearings and the issuance of indicnnents have been held to be
adversary judicial proceedings. See, e.g., Rothgery v. Gillespie, 491 U.S. 293, 296 (2008); Moore
v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220, 231 (1977). The one remaining area of dispute is whether the issuance
of an arrest warrant begins the criminal prosecution. The most recent case is Lattimore v. State,
where the court found that an arrest pursuant to warrant initiates such proceedings. 95 8 So. 2d
192, 198 (Miss. 2007).
63. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
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either provide counsel to poor people in all criminal cases, or in all cases
other than the most minor infractions. 64 A few states illustrate the point:
(1) Some states have lawyers for poor people in essentially all
criminal cases. For instance, California gives appointed counsel in
every case in which the defendant is charged with a misdemeanor or
felony, no regard is given as to actual imprisonment as a possible or
likely penalty. 65 The rule in New York is similar, with the high court
there noting that the state statutory guarantee is more expansive than
that required by the United States Constitution: "[The statute provides]
protection to all defendants accused of felonies and misdemeanors
without reference to the potential sentence attached to the crime."6 6
(2) Other states have broad grants, emphasizing the nature of the
punishment [whether imprisonment or not], asking how serious the
prosecution actually is. North Carolina assigns a lawyer to indigent
defendants in cases in which there will either b e imprisonment, or a
fine of more than $500. 67 The rules in Vermont and Idaho are similar,
looking to the nature of the possible fine rather than only imprisonment
as the sole basis for the appointment of counsel. 68
(3) In the Federal courts, the judges are guided by the inclusive
language of the Criminal Justice Act, 69 which calls attention to the
need for counsel It provides, in part:
(a) Choice of plan.-Each United States district court, with the
approval of the judicial council of the circuit, shall place in operation
throughout the district a plan for furnishing representation for any
person financially unable to obtain adequate representation in
accordance with this section. Representation under each plan shall
include counsel and investigative, expert, and other services necessary
for adequate representation. Each plan shall provide the following:
( 1) Representation shall be provided for any financially eligible
person who-(A) is charged with a felony or a Class A misdemeanor; . ..
64. See infra notes 6.5--{)8 and a ccompanying text.
65 . See Tracy v. Municipal Court, 587 P. 2d 227, 230 {CaL 1978) ; Mills v. Municipal Court,
5 15 P. 2d 273,301 (Cal. 1973).
66. People v. Ross, 493 N.E.2d 91 7, 920 (NY 1986).
67. See N.C. G EN. STAT. § 7A-451(a)(I) {2007).
68. In Vermont, a $1000 potential fine is the dividing line as to whether the defendant has
been charged with a serious crime mandating the appointment of counsel, VT. STAT. tit. 13 §§
523 1, 5201 (4)(B); in Idaho, that line is drawn at $300, State v. Hardman, 818 P. 2d 782, 785
(Idaho App. 1991).
69. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (2008).
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(2) Whenever the United States magistrate judge or the court
determines that the interests ofjustice so require, representation may
be provided for any financially eligible person who(A) is charged with a Class B or C misdemeanor, or an infraction for
which a sentence to confinement is authorized. 70
(4) Some states follow the federal view by relying on the dictates of
fairness or due process. In Delaware, the trial judge is to look at the
totality of circumstances. 71 "If after weighing these factors a court
determines that, as a matter of due process and fundamental fairness,
the defendant should be represented, then counsel should be appointed
even if a Joss of physical liberty is not threatened."72

III. THE PRAISE
The response to the Court's decision in Gideon was overwhelmingly
positive. Savvy criminal justice observers such as Anthony Lewis73 viewed
"the dream of Gideon v. Wainwright . . . [as one] in which every man
charged with a crime will be capably defended"-"Gideon was the start of
the right to counsel revolution in the United States."74 And, the Court's
decision truly was revolutionary.
Prior to Gideon, many criminal
defendants--even in quite serious cases-had to represent themselves at
trial; after Gideon, in most criminal cases, counsel was to be assigned to
assist them.75 Moreover, this assignment was not to be made on any sort of
case by case basis in which a judge or magistrate decided if unusual
conditions were present to justify the outlay of public funds. 76 No, the
appointment of counsel was to be made routinely in most criminal
matters. 77 To be sure, it was not just the most serious crimes which would
form the basis for the right to an attorney. 78 Almost all consequential
70. !d. (emphasis deleted).
71. Black v. Div. of Child Support Enforcement, 686 A. 2d 164, 169 (Del. Super. 1996).
72. !d. ; see supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text for a detailed look at the federal
approaches here.
73 . Author of the highly acclaimed book, GJDEON'S TRUMPET.

74. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, GIDEON'S BROKEN PROMISE: AMERICA'S CONTINUING
QUEST FOR EQUAL JUSTICE, i, iv (2004),
http://www.abanet.org/legalserviceslsclaid/defender/brokenpromise/fullreport.pdf.
75. !d.
76. See supra notes 14-18 and accompanying text. The so-called special circwnstances rule
was announced in Betts v. B~ady. 315 U.S. 791 (1942). The Justices there were not willing to
apply the Sixth Amendment to state cases. !d. Instead, the criminal defe ndant only had a claim
under the U.S. Constitution, if he could show that his due process rights were violated because of
the trying circumstances in his particular case necessitating the assistance of counsel. !d.
77. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 348 ( 1963 ).
78. !d.
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criminal charges would give rise to the automatic appointment of a
lawyer. 79 Even the most minor of cases in which some imprisonmenttruly any imprisonment-was going to be imposed upon conviction would
mandate the presence of counsel. 80
IV. THE CRITIQUES
Gideon and later cases were quite properly praised highly for, finally,
bringing a sense of basic fairness to criminal proceedings. After all, the
notion of a criminal defendant having insufficient assistance was
condemned more than 75 years ago in the Scottsboro case. 81 Few observers
in recent times, however, have spoken quite so positively about
developments in the field. In a host of areas, sadly, the Court's broad and
ringing language seems no longer to be heard. I will address briefly just a
few of these, as I will be focusing attention principally in Section V on an
analysis of the decisions limiting application of the doctrine to trials not
involving sentences of actual imprisonment upon conviction.
A.

THE BREAKDOWN OF THE SYSTEM

Study after study, review upon review, report after report, make
certain-with virtually no dissent-that the hope of providing capable
lawyers to all poor defendants in criminal cases is not being realized. In
spite of enormous sums of money being spent throughout the United States
on tremendous numbers of cases, 82 the system of providing counsel across
much of our nation is, in a word, broken. 83
This writer is co-author of a large national study in which just that
conclusion was reached. 84 Many states and counties around the country fail
to provide adequate funds, training, and staffing for public defender
offices.85 Other areas do not have public defender offices, and instead
contract with the lowest law fum bidder to provide representation for
indigent defendants. 86 In all of these situations, the result is too often
unmanageable caseloads and representation that is so perfunctory or

79. ld.

80. Id.
81. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
82. See Ronald F. Wright & Wayne A. Logan, The Political Economy of Application Fees
for indigent Criminal Defense, 47 WM. & MARY. L. REv. 2045, 2046 (2006).
83. See generally AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION supra note 74, for a comprehensive look.
84. Mazy Sue Backus & Paul Marcus, The Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases, A National
Crisis, 57 HASTINGS L. J. 1031 (2006).
85. /d. at 1034-37.
86. /d. at 1117-18.
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deficient as to amount to no representation at all. 87 One commentator
stated the matter forcefully:
Gideon is a great story, with a great lesson, and for that reason taught
in American high schools, colleges, and law schools. What isn't
taught, however, is our utter failure to realize the promise represented
by Gideon's case. Lewis's book, Gideon's Trumpet, published in
1964, one year after the Gideon decision was handed down, bears the
mark of optimistic faith in progress that so characterized the period.
But even Lewis predicted that it would be an enormous task to bring to
life the dream of Gideon v. Wainwright, the dream in which every man
charged with a crime will be capably defended, no matter what his
economic circumstances, and in which the lawyer representing him
will do so proudly, without resentment at an unfair burden, sure of the
support needed to make an adequate defense. Much like Dr. Martin
Luther King, Jr.'s dream of the same year, the dream of Gideon has not
been realized. The most troubling lesson of the more than thirty-five
years since Gideon v. Wainwright is that neither the Supreme Court
nor the public appears to have any interest in making the constitutional
right announced in Gideon a reality. 88

B. DEFINING INDIGENCY, OR NOT

Without doubt, Clarence Earl Gideon was poor, he had no money.89
Many other indigent individuals similarly situated are obviously entitled to
benefit under the various Supreme Court decisions. 90 However, other
people-even those struggling seriously with financial concerns-may not
be so fortunate as to be entitled to government support for a legal defense,
depending upon which state is prosecuting.
The difficulty here is that the United States Supreme Court through its
many 6th Amendment decisions has never chosen to define the term
indigency; it has never explained the reach of its decisions. The states
hardly have adopted uniform rules. In some states, the defendant will have
to show that she is truly destitute, without any funds at all.91 Other states

87. Backus & Marcus, supra note 84, at 1056; see also Erica Hashimoto, The Price of
Misdemeanor Representation, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 461,464 (2007); Lawrence C. Marshall,
Gideon' s Paradox, 73 FORDHAM L. REv. 955,960 (2004).
88. David Cole, No Equal Justice: Race and Class in the American Criminal Justice System,
98 MICH. L. REv. 1941, 1947-48, 1964--65 (1999).
89. See generally ANTHONY LEWIS, GIDEON'S TRUMPET(1964).
90. The numbers are laid out well in Hashimoto, supra note 87, at 481-83.
91. State v. Hoffman, 190 S.E. 2d 842, 850 (N.C. 1972), where the defendant had a total of
$160.00: "we take judicial notice that for a fee of less than $160.00, defendant could have
obtained counsel." !d. at 739. According to inflation charts, $160.00 in 1972 would be worth
about S822.00 today. Inflation Calculator, http://data.bls.gov/cgi-binlcpicalc.pl (last visited May
13, 2008).
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have statutes which are far more defendant friendly. 9 z Some state courts
take a broad view in judicial decisions and conclude that "it is not
necessary . . . to establish total destitution."93 Other statutes give
essentially no direction at all, speaking in tenns of the accused
"demonstrating [his/her] fmancial inability to obtain legal counsel,"94 or
being "financially unable to secure legal representation. " 9 ~
Unfortunately, we are left with similarly situated individuals being
treated quite dissimilarly throughout the nation. That can hardly be the
result contemplated by Justice Black and his colleagues almost 50 years
ago.96

92. OR. REv. STAT. § 135.050 (2008), which indicates that appointment should occur if "the
defendant is financially unable to retain adequate representation without substantial hardship in
providing basic economic necessities to the defendant or the defendant's dependent family." Id.
93. March v. Municipal Court, 498 P. 2d 437, 441 (Cal. 1972).
94. HAW. REV. STAT. 802-4 (2008).
95. N.C. GEN. STAT. §7A-450(a) (2008).
96. United States 11. Parker, 439 F.3d 81, 93-94 (2d Cir. 2006). Parker is one of the very
few cases in recent years to discuss indigence in any detail:
Courts have utilized a broad range of considerations in conducting an appropriate
inquiry into financial eligibility . . . . The task necessarily varies with the
circumstances presented, and no one method or combination of methods is required.
In many cases, the court's inquiry may properly be limited to re11iew of fiDan cial
information supplied on the standard form fmancial affidavit. In11estigation of the
applicant's assets, liabilities, income and obligations alone may constitute sufficient
inquiry.
We have examined a variety of factors relevant to the fiDancial eligibility
detennination. . . . [W]e [have] highlighted the economic realities of the situation
including the costs of a criminal defense. .
[W]c focused on the business
investments of the defendant. . . . [W]e considered whether the defendant owned or
controlled substantial assets and whether the defendant had concealed those assets.
We also indicated that a defendant's own funds must be wetghed against the
anticipated cost of trial.
We have also considered the defendant's necessities and the cost of providing for
himself and dependents.
Id. at 93 (internal quotations marks and citations omitted). Parker also recognized that the
Federal Act "may not be construed in a way that would ignore the realities of a defendant's duties
with respect to his family." /d.
In making similar determinations ... , the United States Supreme Court and other
Courts of Appeals have also considered such factors as the availability of income to
the defendant from other sources, the possibility of reimbursement of legal fees, the
liquidity of assets for purposes of paying counsel, the applicant's ability to pay a
portion of his counsel's fees, . . . the defendant's credibility (or lack thereof) in
portraying his fmancial eligibility .. , . Overall . .. a district court should not restrict
itself to a particular method of assessing a criminal defendant's eligibility for
appointed counsel.
ld. at 93-94 n.13 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
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INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

For decades, the Supreme Court struggled with the legal standard to
be applied to the many ineffective assistance claims which are brought.
Finally, in Strickland v. Wa.shington, 91 the Justices laid out the basic
principles. The decision began well enough for the indigent defendant, as
the Justices acknowledged that the right to counsel contemplates the work
of a capable lawyer. 98 The difficulty arose, however, with the definition of
just what that is to be. 99 It is a two part test. 100 The defendant to prevail on
an ineffective assistance assertion must show that the lawyer at trial was
not reasonably competent. 101 Here, though, the lower courts are to give
great deference to that lawyer, for the goal of the Constitution, perhaps
surprisingly to many, is not to improve the quality of legal representation,
although that is a goal of considerable importance to the legal system. The
purpose is simply to ensure that criminal defendants receive a fair trial. 102
The hurdle for the defendant is very high here, as the ruling made
clear that excellence is not the standard, simply reasonable competence. 103
If, though, this showing can be made, the second part of the Strickland
standard imposes an even greater hardship on the indigent defendant. To
prevail, she must also demonstrate that the outcome at the trial would have
been different had the lawyer been capable. 104 This is exceedingly difficult
to show, for the charge against many appointed counsel is not that they
affirmatively did something wrong, but rather that they did virtually
nothing at all. Numerous critics have asserted that lawyers have failed to
investigate a case thoroughly, have not thoughtfully prepared defense
witnesses or cross examined government witnesses, have not conducted
careful research, and have not been seriously engaged in the trial. 105
97. Suickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
98. See id. at 685-86.
That a person who happens to be a lawyer is present at uial alongside the accused,
however, is not enough to satisfy the constitutional command. The Sixth Amendment
recognizes the right to the assistance of counsel because it envisions counsel's playing
a role that is critical to the ability of the a dversarial system to produce just results. An
accused is entitled to be assisted by a n attorney, whether retained or appointed, who
plays the role necessary to ensure that the trial is fair. For that reason, the Court has
recognized that "the right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of.

COWlSeJ."

!d. at 685-86.
99. !d. at 686.
100. See id. at 687.
101. /d.
102. !d at 689.
103. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688.
104. /d. at 694.
105. See, e.g ., Stephen B. Bright, In Defense ofLife: Enforcing the Bill of Rights on Behalf of
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Moreover, the lax application of the Sixth 6th Amendment to these cases
does not impact solely on the defendants, though it surely does that. It has
dire consequences for the lawyers as well:
Constitutional decisions interpreting the Sixth Amendment have
established a standard for effective assistance of counsel that has been
universally criticized as far less demanding than the ethical and
professional standards governing defense attorneys. The result is that,
rather than requiring defenders of the indigent to meet professional
standards, the constitutional test for ineffective assistance sets the
standard far lower and permits, and some argue encourages, deficient
lawyering. 106

While recently the Supreme Court, at times, has been willing to more
actively apply the Strickland standard in some capital cases, few such
applications can be cited. 107 Not many cases can be seen which rebut the
hard criticism given two decades ago by Justice Marshall that "all manner
of negligence, ineptitude, and even callous disregard for the client pass
muster under the Strickland standard." 108
D.

THE STAGE AND TYPE OF PROCEEDINGS

After a few decades of decisions regarding the 6th Amendment we
are left, as discussed above, with a rather peculiar situation as to the stage
and type of proceeding to which the counsel right applies. The defendant
will be allowed the appointment of counsel only if she has been formally
charged, and only if she is personally confronted by witnesses against
her. 109 The situation truly is peculiar, for it results in quite unfair conditions
for some criminal defendants. 110

Poor, M inoriry and Disadvantaged Persons Facing the Death Penalry, 57 Mo. L. REv. 849, 85859 (1992); Monroe H. Freedman, An Ethical Manifesto for Public Defenders, 39 VAL. U. L. REV.
911, 912 (2005); WilliamS. Geimer, A Decade in Strickland's Tin Horn: Doctrinal and Practical
Undermining of the Right to Counsel, 4 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 91, 100 (1995); Bruce A.
Green, Criminal Neglect: Indigent Defense from a Legal Ethics Perspective , 52 EMORY L.J.
1169, 1169-70 (2003).
106. Backus & Marcus, supra note 84, at !087.
107. Stephen F. Smith, The Supreme Court and the Politics of Death, 94 VA. L. REV. 283,
348-49 (2008); see Robert R. Rigg, The T-Ra Without Teeth: Evolving Strickland v. Washington
and the Test for Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 35 PEPP. L. REv. 77, 86-87 (2007). Even
those authorS would seemingly concede, however, that the broader view of sm·ckland occurs
almost always, when it happeru, in capital cases.
108. Bright, supra note 105, at 860 (citing remarks of Justice Marshall to the Second Circuit
Judicial Conference in 1988).
109. Backus & Marcus, supra note 84, at 1041-42.
110. See William Pena Wells & Brian L. Cutler, The Rightto Counsel at Videotaped Lineups:
An Emerging Dilemma, 22 CONN. L. REV. 373 (1990).
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The Identification

The Wade and Kirby cases make clear the problem at issue. All are in
agreement as to the difficulties of eyewitness identification} 11 In many
cases, identifications have been shown to be untrustworthy, yet juries
appear to rely heavily upon the statements made by witnesses indicating
that this person was the one who committed the crime. 112 Still, even with
this reality-and the strong language in Wade as to the role to be played by
defense counsel here-we can see two defendants who will be treated quite
differently in terms of the assignment of counsel, because of the
requirement that there be a formal charge before the presence of counsel is
needed.
Defendant #1 was arrested on the street, taken to the police station
and immediately placed in a lineup over her objection that she was not
given the right to have a lawyer observe. She was there identified by the
victim of the crime, and soon thereafter formally charged with the crime.
Without much doubt, the witness's statement of identification will be
admissible at the trial, even though a defense lawyer was not present at the
identification.
Defendant #2 was also arrested on the street, also taken to the police
station, and then formally charged with the crime. Immediately thereafter,
he was placed in a lineup over his objection that he was not given the right
to have a lawyer observe. He was there identified by the victim of the
crime. Without much doubt, the witness's statement of identification will
not be admissible at the trial, precisely because defense counsel for him
was not present at the identification.113 Indeed, the witness's in-court
identification might also not be admissible if it is viewed as tainted by the
earlier identification. 114
111. The Innocence Project indicates that eyewitness misidentification is the single greatest
cause of wrongful convictions nationwide, playing a role in more than 75% of convictions
overturned through DNA testing. Innocence Project, Eyewitness Misidentification,
http://www.innocenceproject.org/understand/Eyewitness-Misidentification.php.
112. Marc Green, Errors in Eyewitness Identification Procedures,
http://www.visualexpert.com/Resources/mistakenid.html. "Jurors treat eyewitness identification
as compelling evidence in both civil and criminal trials." /d.
113. This was very much the situation in Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220 (1977). There, the
defendant was identified at a hearing, but the Court would not allow evidence of that
identification, on Sixth Amendment grounds. /d. This, in spite of the fact that the identification
was made in open court, and in front of a judge and the states' attorney. /d. If, however, the
identification bad been made twenty minutes earlier, en route to the charging procedure, it seems
clear that the identification would not have raised right to counsel concerns.
114. See Dunnigan v. Keane, 137 F. 3d 117 (2d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 840; State
v. McMorris, 570 N.W. 2d 384 (Wis. 1997); United States v. Williams, 999 S. Supp. 412
(W.D.N.Y. 1998).
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This result is peculiar because the defendant is in the same situation in
both cases, as is the witness and also the identification procedure. The only
difference is whether that lineup took place just before, or just after, the
formal charge. This concern, surely, is at the base of the decisions in some
states to give appointed counsel even before a formal charge is brought. 115
115. Under§ 13 of the Indiana Constitution, Indiana's right to counsel may attach before the
filing of formal charges . See Ajabu v. State, 693 N.E.2d 921, 928 n.4 (Ind. 1998); see also Taylor
v. State, 689 N.E.2d 699, 702-{)4 (Ind. 1997). Article I, section 6 of the New York Constitution
applies the right to counsel upon the initiation of formal proceedings, or where an uncharged
person has actually retained a lawyer, or while in custody, has requested a lawyer. See N.Y.
CONST. art. 1, § 6; People v. Lyons, 4 A.D.3d 549, 551 (N.Y. A.D. 3 Dept. 2004). Mississippi
extends the right to counsel to the "accusatory stage" instead of adopting the formal charge and
critical stage standards required by Kirby. See Porter v. State, 732 So. 2d 899, 904 (Miss. 1999)
(noting that the 6th Amendment right to counsel and the Mississippi constitution's right to
counsel "are identical and differ only as to the time when each attaches"). Mississippi's right to
counsel attaches "once the proceedings against the defendant reach the accusatory stage." Page v.
State, 495 So. 2d 436, 439 (Miss. 1986). The "accusatory stage" is defined by Mississippi law to
occur when a warrant is issued or, "by binding over or recognizing the offender to compel his
appearance to answer the offense, as well as by indictment or affidavit." !d. This right to counsel
"attaches at the point in time when 'the initial appearance under Rul e 1.04 ... ought to have been
held .... "' Porter, 732 So. 2d at 904. Oregon posits an even broader interpretation of"criminal
prosecution" in order to extend the state constitution's right to counsel, OR. CONST. art. I ,§ II,
prior to the filing of formal charges. See State v. Spencer, 750 P.2d 147, 155-56 (Or. 1988). The
Oregon Supreme Court he ld that an arrested driver has a limited right to counsel prior to deciding
whether to acquiesce to a breath test. Id. at 156. In attaching the right to counsel after arrest, but
before charging, the court found that:
A person taken into fonnal custody by the police on a potentially criminal charge is
confronted with the full legal power of the state, regardless of whether a formal
charge has been filed. Where such custody is complete, neither the lack of a selected
charge nor the possibility that the police will think better of the e ntire matter changes
the fact that the arrested person is, at that moment, ensnared in a "crimina!
prosecution." The evanescent nature of the evidence the police seek to obtain may
justify substantially limiting the time in which the person may exercise h1s or her
Article I, section 11, right, but it does not justify doing away with it.
Id. at 155-56.
While states commonly extend the right to counsel prior to formal charging by a confirmation of
constitutional provisions and case law, some states also explicitly extend the right with speci fi e
statutory rights. This approach is often adopted to extend the right to counsel when the accused is
requested to submit to a pre-charge chemical test that may produce incriminating evidence. For
example, in State v. Sadek, the North Dakota Supreme Court wrote that the "r ight [of an arrested
person] to consult with an attorney before taking a chemical test is not derived from the state or
fe deral constitutions, but from section 29-05-20, N.D.C.C." 552 N.W.2d 7 1, 72-73 (N.D. 1996).
The Vermont Supreme Court in State v. Welch, interpreted 23 V.S.A. § 1205(a), a statute
governing implied consent for blood alcohol testing, to recognize a limited right to counsel. 376
A .2d 35 1, 355 ( 1977). As submission to such a chemical test m ay constitute a critical stage of the
criminal proceedings against the accused, this implied consent law places "the suspect operator in
a situation where counsel could be of aid." !d. The decision was then codified in 23 V.S.A. §
1202(c) (2008), stating in part: "A person who is requested by a law enforcement officer to
submit to an evidentiary test or tests has a right as herein limited to consult an attorney before
deciding whether or not to submit to such a test or tests ...." The Washington State Supreme
Court recognized a right to counsel based not on the 6th Amendment, the state constitution, state
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The Confrontation

It is only if the defendant is personally confronted by others that the
right to counsel issue arises, even if the identification proceeding occurs
after an indictment. 116 So, full and partial lineups may require counsel, but
photo displays and sampling of voice, blood, hair, and fmgerprints do
not. 117 Here, too, one can label the result as peculiar, for the empirical
evidence strongly advises against non-live photo identifications; these
identifications raise grave concerns about misidentifications. 118 The
response of the Justices, in the Ash case, was dismissive. 119 "We are not
persuaded that the risks inherent in the use of photographic displays are so
pernicious that an extraordinary system of safeguards is required." 120

statutes, or even other case law, but instead on a state judicial rule, pursuant to the court's
procedural autho rity. See generally State v. Templeton, 59 P.3d 632 (Wa. 2002) (discussing state
judicial rule and procedJ.Iral authority). The Washington court focused on its proced ural rulemaking authority over matters of evidence, and ellplained that in the absence of its intervention,
the 6th Amendment right to counsel would generally only attach upon the initiation of adver sary
judicial proceedings. !d.
116. See U.S. v. A sh, 41 3 U.S. 300,3 16 (1973).
ll7. ld. at 3 15-1 6.
118. These concerns are reflecte d in the many studies calling for sweeping changes to the
processes used for such identification. See, e.g., JOHN K. VAN DE KAMP, CALIFORNIA
COMMISSION ON THE FAIR ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE: REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS
REGARDING EYEWITNESS IDENIIFICATION PROCEDURES passim (2006),
http:l/www.ccfaj.orgldocuments/reports/eyewitnesslofficiaVeyewitnessidrep.pdf; see also Karin
Bruilliard, Revamping Virginia's Police Lineups, WASH. POST, Mar. 6, 2005, at COl, available at
http://www.psychology.iastatc.edul-glwclls/washingtonpostVirginiastory.pdf;
STATE
OF
WISCONSIN OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, MODEL POLICY AND PROCEDURE FOR
EYEWlTNESS IDENTIFICATION (2005),
http://www.doj.state.wi.us/dles/tns/EyewitnessPublic.pdf. See Sandra Guerra Thompson, Beyond
a Reasonable Doubt? Reconsidering Uncorroborated Eyewitness Identification Testimony, 41
U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1487 (2008), for fme discussion of the broad legal problems here. See also
State v. Dubose, 699 N.W.2d 582 (Wis. 2005). These sources explore the empirical evidence:
Heather D. Flow & Ebbe B. Ebbeson, The Effect of Lineup Member Similarity on Recognition
Accuracy in Simultaneous and Sequential Lineups, 3 I LAW & HUM. BEHAv. 33 (2007); Beth
Schuster, Police Lineups: Making Eyewitness Identification More Reliable, NAT'L INST. OF JUST.
258 (Oct. 2007), available at http://www.oj p.usdoj.gov/nij/joum als/258/policelineups.hJml#backiO; Gary L. Wells et a!., Eyewitness Evidence: Improving Its Probative Value,
7 PSCYCHOL. SCI. TN THE PUB. INT. 2, 45 (2006), available at
http://www.psychology.iastate.edulfaculty/gwells/W ells_articles_pdf/pspi_7_2_article[ I ).pdf;
James M. Doyle, No Confidence: A Step Toward Accuracy in Eyewitness Trials, THE CHAMPION
(Jan./Feb. 1998),
http://www .crirninaljustice.orgiCHAMPION/ARTICLES/98jan0 l.htm.
119. Ash, 413 U.S. at 32 1.
120. !d.
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THE TYPE OF CASE

The Supreme Court in Gideon had before it the ideal case in which to
state the 6th Amendment doctrine. 121 After all, the defendant there
specifically requested a lawyer at the trial in a serious criminal case. 122 At
Gideon's trial, he was sentenced to a term of five years in the state
penitentiary. 123 What would happen if this had not been such a serious
case, if he had not been sentenced to any term of imprisonment? One
might be excused if, after viewing the glorious Gideon's Trumpet, 124 he or
she thought that the defendant would have been entitled to a lawyer even
though no imprisonment had been ordered. 125 To be sure, it is a common
misconception that all criminal defendants in the United States are entitled
to assisted counsel if they cannot afford to hire a lawyer. 126

121. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 336-38 (1963).
122. !d. at 336-37.
123. !d. at 337.
124. GIDEON'S TRUMPET {Hallmark Hall of Fame Productions 1980) is a 1980 film starring
Henry Fonda, with a short cameo appearance at the very end of the movie by Anthony Lewis,
author of the book GIDEON'S TRUMPET {1964).
125. GIDEON'S TRUMPET, supra note 124.
126. See generally WALTER DEAN MYERS, SHOOTER 164 (2004) (including a fictitious
"Statement of Waiver of Privilege and Miranda Warning," which reads, in part, "I further
understand that I have a right to an attorney. If I cannot, on my own, avail myself of legal help, [
will be furnished with an attorney by the State."); Everyone Is Entitled to an Attorney,
http:/!homesweethome.wordpress.com/200812/11/everyone-is-entitled-to-an-attomey/ (Feb. 11,
2008 06:00 EST) (commenting on an article describing the investigation of accused murderer
Andrew Boisvert); Gideon's Trumpet Stilled, N.Y. TlMES.COM, Mar. 21, 2003,
http://query.nytimes. com/gstlfullpage.html?res""9A02E4DE1 E31 F932A 15 750COA965 9C 8B63&s
cp=2sq=poor+right+to+lawyer&st=nyt (suggesting that all poor criminal d efendants have a
constitutional right to a lawyer, regardless of whether confinement is possible, and going an to
note that "[t]hat principle is now ingrained in our culture"); Preserving the Right to a Lawyer,
N.Y.TIMES.COM, Apr. 25,2005,
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/04/25/opinionf25mon2.html?scp=l&sq=poor+right+to+lawyer&st
"''lyt {stating that "Criminal defendants who cannot afford a lawyer have the right to have one
appointed to represent them" and "[t]he Supreme Court ruled in the landmark case of Gideon v.
Wainwright that poor defendants have a constitutional right to appointed counsel"); Promise of
Right to Counsel for Poor Remains an ll/usion in Michigan (Especially in Berrien}, BANCO
(BLACK AUTONOMY NETWORK COMMUNITY 0RGANIZATION), Mar. 18, 2008,
http:/lbhbanco.blogspot.com/2008/04/promise-of-right·to-counsel-for-poor.html (''[t]he landmark
1963 [Gideon] decision held that the Constitution guarantees every person ... the right to an
attorney even if he or she cannot afford one); Joyce Pumick, Metro Matters; A110ther Frill:
Giving the Poor Good Lawyers, N.Y. T!MES.COM, Mar. 11, 1996,
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9B03EEDC1039F932A25750COA960958260&s
ec=&spon=&pagewanted=2 (addressing the inability of indigent individuals to obtain adequate
legal representation: "[p]oor defendants, by law, have a right to a lawyer, but the courts are
swamped"); The Right to Counsel, N.Y. TIMES.COM, Jan. 24,2003,
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C02
EOD71 F30F93 7A I 5752COA9659C8B63
(quoting Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 347 (1963), but failing to mention that the doctrine
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That, of course, is not the law. As noted above, the Justices in Scott
and Shelton decided that an attorney is not required in all criminal cases. It
is just that the sentencing judge cannot order any term of imprisonment
[either on an immediate or suspended basis] unless counsel had been
offered to the defendant. 127 Many have disagreed with the Court's holding
on basic fairness grounds. One commentator stated the matter cogently:
Therefore, if we accept the Gideon premise that a defendant may suffer
damage from the lack of counsel, the necessary conclusion is that
every criminal defendant is entitled to be represented by counsel if she
so wishes. There is no reason to allow a defendant to be convicted
after an unfair trial when the potentially unfair result is known from
only applies to defendants facing potential incarceration); Jill Smolowe, The Trials of the Public
Defender, TIME.COM, Mar. 29, 1993,
http://www.time.com/timefmagazine/article/0,9171,9781 05-l,OO.html ("The Sixth Amendment
established, and the landmark Gideon Supreme Court case affirmed, the right of poor people to
legal counsel," without regard to severity of potential criminal penalty or incarceration); The Law
Firm of Solomon M. Musyimi, A Professional Corporation Homepage,
http://www.solomonthelawyer.com!houston_lawfurn!houston_criminal_law.htm (stating that
"[e]very person accused of a crime has the right to an attorney [and ilf you cannot afford an
attorney, the state must provide one) (last visited June 12, 2008); Posting of J, Raichasa,
Justaquestioner, Mild Irritant, & Rich K to Yahoo! Answers,
http://answers.yahoo.com/questionlindex?qid=2008021218453 6AAkqJA3 (Feb.
12, 2008
18:45:46 EST) (concluding that J is entitled to a court appointed lawyer for two unspecified
misdemeanor charges); Posting of William A. Saunders to AIIExperts Crime & Law Enforcement
Issues & Death Penalty,
http://en.allexperts.com/q/Crime·Law-Enforcement·341!2008/4/Misdemeanor·Shoplifting·2.htm
(answering a question about shoplifting consequences, poster advises that, based on the
information he had been provided, she will be assigned a public defender if she cannot afford an
attorney) (Apr. 14, 2008).
Indeed, in my Criminal Procedure class each year, I ask a group of second and third year
law students -bright, thoughtful, well educated people- the following questions:
An important area for discussion is the right to counsel in criminal cases in the United
States. Before coming to law school, which of these positions did you think was
correct: (1) A person who is too poor to afford to hire a lawyer is entitled to appointed
counsel if, upon conviction, she could receive a sentence in excess of6 months in jail;
(2) A person who is too poor to afford to hire a lawyer is entitled to appointed counsel
if, upon conviction, she could receive a sentence of actual imprisonment; (3) A person
who is too poor to afford to hire a lawyer is entitled to appointed counsel in all
criminal cases; (4) person who is too poor to afford to hire a lawyer is never entitled
to appointed counsel in criminal cases.
In February 2008, the result in votes was: 0 votes for (1); 14 votes for (2); 52 votes for (3); I vote
for (4). This was a fairly typical tally for the annual exercise. Most people I encounter think poor
people will get appointed counsel in all criminal cases. Indeed, one student in the class wrote a
personal note: "This is embarrassing, but in the spirit of helping your survey, I feel that 1 must
tell you that my original understanding of the "right of counsel" wasn't listed on your survey. I
didn't think that "being poor" was a part of it-I just thought you had a right to an attorney, no
matter who you are. And sadly, I didn't make the connection until this semester that income is an
essential component."
127. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373-74 (1979); Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 674
(2002).
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the outset of trial, however minor the offense committed. As long as
petty offenses are considered criminal and are not adjudicated through
non-judicial avenues, such as administrative bodies, a person is entitled
to a fair trial before being labeled an offender. 128

And, certainly, there are a number of states which do indeed require
counsel in all criminal cases, by statute or by state constitutional
provision. 129 Still, many defendants are forced to proceed without a lawyer
in criminal cases, as we shall see. In the next section, I will set out the
concerns as to this state of affairs and argue why -for several reasons-the
common perception should become the reality.
V. WHY LIMIT THE RIGHT TO CASES WITH AN
IMPRJSONMENT CONNECTION?
It is fair to say that the issues being raised in this article have not been
among the most hotly debated within the criminal justice system in recent
times. Some states, and there are quite a number of them -as indicated
below-rejected the imprisonment connection entirely. They passed
statutes, or interpreted their own constitutions, so as to require counsel in
all or virtually all criminal cases. However, other states, many facing
intense budget concerns, simply did not move on the matter. There has
been little discussion as to the several broad policy issues raised by the
Supreme Court's restriction. Only two issues have garnered much
attention.

A. THE CONCERNS

1.

The Intent, Language in the 6th Amendment

The 6th Amendment provides, in part: "In all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall . . . have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense." 130
Obviously, there is nothing in this language about the appointment of
lawyers for those who cannot afford to retain counsel. On this point, the
legislative history seems pretty clear, the founders were not contemplating
such appointments. Instead, the Amendment was offered to ensure that a
hearing would "include[] the right to the aid of counsel when desired and
provided by the party asserting the right."m "Regardless of whether
128. Rinat Kitai, What Remains Necessary Following Alabama v. Shelton to Fulfill the Right
of a Criminal Defendant to Counsel at the Expense ofthe State?, 30 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 35, 46
(2004).
129. See supra notes 65-72 and accompanying text.
130. U.S. C ONST. amend. VI.
131. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45,68 (1932).
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petitioner would have been entitled to the appointment of counsel, his right
to be heard through his own counsel was unqualified." 132
Still, this was also the argument made by Florida in Gideon and, of
course, that view did not prevail, because the assistance of a lawyer was
said to be fundamental and essential to a fair trial. 133 Moreover, one might
have thought that once the Court ruled that criminal defendants such as
Clarence Gideon were entitled to appointed counsel and not simply because
of special circumstances, 134 the language in the Constitution, In all criminal
prosecutions, would actually be taken to mean that appointment was
required in all cases rather than simply in some cases.
2.

The Costs Would Be Too High

Clearly of great pause for the Justices in possibly extending counsel
rights in all criminal cases was the financial impact it would have on the
states. The former Chief Justice stated the matter succinctly in Scott:
"Argersinger has proved reasonably workable, whereas any extension
would create confusion and impose unpredictable, but necessarily
substantial, costs on 50 quite diverse States." 135 Justice Powell, concurring
in Argersinger, was considerably more thoughtful as to the types of costs
that a blanket rule would create:
Despite its overbreadth, the easiest solution would be a prophylactic
rule that would require the appointment of counsel to indigents in all
criminal cases. The simplicity of such a rule is appealing because it
could be applied automatically in every case, but the price of pursuing
this easy course could be high indeed in terms of its adverse impact on
the administration of the criminal justice systems of 50 States. This is
apparent when one reflects on the wide variety of petty or
misdemeanor offenses, the varying definitions thereof, and the
diversity of penalties prescribed. The potential impact on state court
systems is also apparent in view of the variations in types of courts and
their jurisdictions, ranging from justices of the peace and part-time
judges in the small communities to the elaborately staffed police courts
which operate 24 hours a day in the great metropolitan centers. 136

While no one would suggest that these costs are insubstantial, 137 the
fact is that when Scott was decided, most states actually did then provide
132. Chandler v. Fretag, 348 U.S. 3, 9 (1954).
133. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335,342 (1963).
134. After all, Gideon overruled the special circumstances re quirement earlier set out in Betts
v. Brady. ld. a t 350 (Douglas, J., concurring). It did so with ringing language, noting "th at Bells
was an anachronism when handed down." ld. at 345.
135. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373 (1979).
136. /d . at 50--51 (Powell, J., concurring).
137. These costs are well laid out in Hashimoto, supra note 87, at 485-86.
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lawyers in almost all criminal cases. 138 And, they still do. Thus, it is hard
to believe that the costs would be so overbearing so as to weigh too heavily
on the constitutional analysis. In 1979, when the Scott decision was
handed down, as stated by dissenting Justice Brennan:
[A] substantial number of States ... already provide counsel in all
cases where imprisonment is authorized- States that include a large
majority of the country's population and a great diversity of urban and
rural environments. Moreover, of those States that do not yet provide
counsel in all cases where any imprisonment is authorized, many
provide counsel when periods of imprisonment longer than 30 days, 3
months, or 6 months are authorized. In fact, Scott would be entitled to
appointed counsel under the current laws of at least 33 States. 139
Jn 2009, the numbers are even more stark as to states which give
counsel in criminal cases. Forty-six states provide counsel in all, or
virtually all, criminal cases. 140 The statutory language varies from state to
138. See Scott, 440 U.S. at 385-86 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
139. !d. at 385- 87 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Of course, as noted by Justice Brennan, one of
the reasons that the costs have not proved insurmountable has been the development of public
defender offices throughout the country:
Furthermore, public defender systems have proved economically feasible, and the
establishment of such systems to replace appointment of private attorneys can keep
costs at acceptable levels even when the number of cases requiring appointment of
counsel increases dramatically. The public defender system alternative also answers
the argument that an "authorized imprisonment" standard would clog the c ourts with
inexperienced appointed counsel.
/d. at 385.
140. States that provide counsel in criminal cases are as follows: Alaska: ALASKA CONST. art.
I, § 11, ALASKA STAT. § 18.85.100 (2008), Alexander v. City of Anchorage, 490 P.2d 910
(Alaska 1971); Arizona: ARIZ. R. CRJM. P. 6.l(b); Arkansas: ARK. R. CRIM. P. 8.2(b); California:
CAL. PENAL CODE § 987 (2008); Colorado: COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 21-1-103(1,2), 16-5-501
(2008); Connecticut: CONN. GEN. STAT.§§ 51-296(a), -297(t) (2008); Delaware: DEL. CODE tit.
29, § 4602 (2003); Florida: FLA. R. CRJM. P. 3.1ll(b); Georgia: GA. UN!F. SUP. Cr. R. 29.2;
Hawaii: HAW. CONST. art. I, § 14; Idaho; IDAHO CODE§§ 19-851, 852 (2008); Illinois: 725 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 5/113-3(b) (2008); Indiana: IND. CONST. art. I, § 13, Bolkovac v. State, 98 N.E.2d
150 (Ind. 1951); Iowa: IOWA R. CRJM. P. 2.28, 2.61; Kentucky: KY. R. CRIM. P. 3.05; Louisiana:
LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 513 (2003); Maine: ME. R. CRJM. P. 44; Maryland: Mo. CODE CRJM.
PROC. § 16-204 (2008); Massachusetts: MASS. SUP. Juo. Cr. R. 3:10, MASS. R. CRIM. P. 8;
Minnesota: MINN. STAT.§§ 609.02, 611.14 (2008); Mississippi: MISS. CODE §§ 25-32-9, 99-1515 (2008); Missouri: MO. SUP. CT. R. 31.02; Montana: MONT. CODE § 46-8-10 I (2008);
Nebraska: NEB. REV. STAT. 29-3902, -3906 (2008); Nevada: NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 178.397,
193.120 (2008); New Hampshire: N.H. REv. STAT.§§ 604-A:2, 625:9 (2008) ; New Jersey: N.J.
STAT. § 2A:158A-5.2 (2008); New Mexico: N.M. Stat. § 31-15-12 (2008); New York: N.Y.
CR!M. P. LAW§ § 170.10(3), 180.10(3) (2008), N.Y. COUNTY LAW§§ 717, 722-a (2008), People
v . Weinstock, 363 N.Y.S.2d 878 (1974); North Carolina: N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-451(a) (2008);
North Dakota: N.D. R. CRJM . P. 44; Ohio: OH!O R. CRIM. P. 2, 44; Oklahoma: OKLA. STAT. tit.
22, § 1355.6 (2008); Oregon: OR. REV. STAT.§§ 135.045, 135.050(6) (2008); Pennsylvania: PA.
R. CR!M. P. l22(A); Rhode Island: R.I. SUP. Cr. R. CRJM. P. 44, R.I. DIST. CT. R. CRIM. P. 44;
South Dakota: S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-40-6 (2008); Tennessee: TENN. CODE§§ 40- 14-102,
103 (2008); Texas: TEX. CODE CRJM. PROC. art. 26.04 (2007); Utah: UTAH CODE CRIM. P. § 77-
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state, however, there are essentially five ways in which to group states and
their right to counsel statutes-<>nly one grouping consists of states which
do not grant counsel in all, or virtually, all criminal cases. 141 Nine states
provide counsel in all criminal cases. 142 Fifteen states offer counsel for any
offense punishable by imprisonment. 143 Eight states give counsel for any
offense punishable by incarceration or a fine of more than a specified
amount, or for any offense with a minimum incarceration period or fine. 144
Fourteen states provide counsel for any criminal offense except when
imprisonment is not authorized as a sentence. 145 Five states require a
sentence of actual imprisonment for a defendant to be entitled to courtappointed counsel. 146

32-302 (2008); Vermont: VT. STAT. tit. 13, §§ 5201, 5231 (2008); Virginia: VA. CODE§ § 19.2159, 160 (2008); Washington: WASH. SUPER. CT. R. § 3.1; West Virginia: W.VA. CODE§ 62-3-1
(2008); Wisconsin: WIS. STAT. § 967.06 (2008); and Wyoming: WYO. STAT. §§ 7-6-102, 104
(2008).
141. See ALA. CRIM. P. §§ 15-12-1, -20 (2008); KAN. STAT. §§ 12-4405, 22-4503; MICH.
COMP. LAWS§ 775.16 (2008); S.C. CODE§ 17-3-10 (2008); ALA. R. CRIM. P. 6.1 ; State v.
Delacruz, 899 P.2d 1042 (Kan. 1995); People v. Studaker, 199 N.W.2d 177 (Mich. 1972).
142. See IND. CONST. art. I,§ 13; CAL. PENAL CODE§ 987 (2008); DEL. CODE tit. 29, § 4602
(2003); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 135.045, 135.050(6) (2007); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-40-6
(2007); TENN. CODE §§ 40-14-102, -103 (2007); W. VA. CODE § 62-3-1 (2005); GA UNIF.
SUPER. CT. R. 29.2; R.I. SUPER. CT. R. CRIM. P. 44; R.I. DIST. CT. R. CRJM. P. 44; Bolkovac v.
State, 98 N.E.2d 250 (Ind. 1951);
143. See HAW. CONST. art. I,§ 14; IDAHO CODE§§ 19-851, -852 (2007); NEB. REV. STAT.
29-3902, -3906 (2007); N.H. REV. STAT.§§ 604-A:2, 625:9 (2008); N.M. STAT.§ 31-15-12
(2008); N.C. GEN. STAT.§ 7A-45l(a) (2007); OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 1355.6 (2008); WIS. STAT.§
967.06 (2007); ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 6. l(b); IOWA R. CRIM. P. 2.28, 2.61; KY. R. CRJM. P. 3.05; LA.
CODE CRJM. PROC. art. 513 (2003); MASS. R. CRJM. P. 8; MASS. SUP. JUD. Cr. R. 3:10; N.Y.
CRIM. PROC. LAW§§ 170.10(3), 180.10(3) (2008); N.Y. COUNTY LAW§§ 7 17, 722-a (2008);
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 26.04 (2007); WASH. SUPER. CT. R. § 3.1; People v. Weinstock, 363
N.Y.S.2d 878 (1974).
144. See ALASKA CONST. art. I, § II; ALASKA STAT. § 18.85.100 (2007); 725 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 5/ 113-3(b) (1993); MD. CODE art. 27A §§ 2, 4 (2007); MINN. STAT. §§ 609.02, 611.14
(2007); MISS. CODE§§ 25-32·9, 99-15-15 (1972); NEV. REV. STAT.§§ 178.397, 193.120 (2007);
OHIO R. CRIM. P. 2, 44; MD. CODE CRIM. P. § 16-204 (2008); Alexander v. City of Anchorage,
490 P.2d 910 (Alaska 1971).
145. See COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 21-1-103(1,2), 16-5-501 (2007); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 51296(a), -297(1) (2008); MONT. CODE§ 46-8-101 (2007); N.J. STAT.§ 2A:I58A-5.2 (2008); UTAH
CODE § 77-32-302 (2007) (discussing where there is a substantial probability of confinement);
VA. CODE§§ 19.2-159, -160 (2004); VT. STAT. tit. 13, §§ 5201, 5231 (2007); WYO. STAT.§§ 76-102, -104 (2007); ARK. R. CRJM. P. 8.2(b); FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.1ll(b); ME. R. CR!M. P. 44;
N.D. R. CRIM. P. 44 (applying to all non-felony cases); PA. R. CRIM. P. 122(A); MO. SUP. CT. R.
31.02.
146. See KAN. STAT.§§ 12-4405, 22-4503; ALA. CODE§§ 15-12- 1, -20 (2008); MICH. COMP.
LAWS§ 775.16 (2006); S.C. CODE§ 17-3-10 (2007); ALA. R. CRJM. P. 6.1; State v. Delacruz, 899
P.2d 1042 (Kan. 1995); People v. Studaker, 199 N.W.2d 177 (Mich. 1972) (discussing any felony
but only with actual imprisonment for misdemeanors).
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FOUR GOOD REASONS TO ELIMINATE THE RESTRICTIVE R ULE

If the concerns about extending the right to counsel to all, or virtually
all, criminal cases in all states are not overpowering, are there at least some
strong reasons to extend that right? Yes, there are, and here are four of the
most persuasive.

1.

The Problem is Not Simply Possible, It Happens Regularly

While many states go beyond the federal mandate and give counsel
essentially in all criminal cases, that is certainly not the universal rule.
Quite a number of states do not give counsel in cases in which
imprisonment is not likely to be a serious option for the sentencing judge. 147
Furthermore, in several of them, a conviction at that trial can be used
adversely against the defendant later. 148 Consider these illustrative states. 149
a. Arizona
Arizona state law does not require the appointment of counsel in all
cases, and according to one judge there are individuals who are denied
counsel because the offense does not carry j ail time or is not an offense
involving moral turpitude. 150 As put by one permanent law clerk, if the
prosecutor expressly states he or she is not seeking jail time and the
defendant will not be held in custody, it is unlikely counsel will be
appointed, even if requested. 151 The web page for the Tucson City Court
states:
You have the right to hire an attorney at your own expense and have
that attorney represent you at trial. You should know that the court
will appoint an attorney to you only if the prosecutor is seeking jail
time as part of your sentence, and the judge finds that you cannot
afford an attorney. 152

b. Illinois
Under state law, appointment of counsel is broad. Still, one code

147. See, e.g. , MICH. COMP. LAWS § 775.1 6 (2006); see also People v. Studaker, 199 N.W. 2d
177, 179 (Mich. 1972) (stating that any felony but only with actua l imprisonment for
misdemeanors).
148. See infr a section V .B.2.
149. These examples come from reported cases, statutes and a lso correspondence (which is on
file with the author) with j udges, prosecutors and de fense lawyers in the respective states.
150. See ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 6.l (b).
15 1. This example comes from correspondence, which is on file with the author.
152. Tucson City Court, Your Rights,
http ://www.tucsonaz.gov/courts!How_ T o!M:otions_·
_ Pro_Se!Your_ Day_In_ CourtlYour_Rights/your_rights.html (last visited May 13, 2008).
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section notes that counsel is not always given. 153 "In all cases, except
where the penalty is a fine only, if the court determines that the defendant
is indigent and desires counsel, the Public Defender shall be appointed as
counsel." 154 As explained by one law professor there, in some parts of the
state no lawyer is appointed where jail is not a possible sentence. 155
c. Florida
The key here is whether the prosecutor is seeking imprisonment upon
conviction. One judge said, "[e)ven if the defendant wishes to have an
attorney we do not appoint attorneys based on the announcement on the
record by the state that they are not seeking jail time [in misdemeanor
cases)." 156 A law professor who has worked closely with public defender
offices wrote:
[I]f the judge announce[s] that he/she will not impose a sentence of
confinement in the case ... [t]he judge ... will inform the defendant
that he/she is no longer entitled to the services of the public defendant.
. . . [O]nce the judge has made the decision to not impose confinement
as a sentence the defender is not allowed to assist the defendant. 157

d. Virginia
Virginia state law is quite explicit as to the ability of the trial court to
require an indigent defendant to proceed on her own without the aid of a
lawyer.
However, if, prior to the commencement of the trial, the court states in
writing, either upon the request of the attorney for the Commonwealth
or, in the absence of the attorney for the Commonwealth, upon the
court's own motion, that a sentence of incarceration will not be
imposed if the defendant is convicted, the court may try the case
without appointing counsel, and in such event no sentence of
incarceration shall be imposed. 158

As stated by one experienced judge, the provision is not used
frequently, but is used, both on motion of the prosecutor and on the judge's
own motion. 159

153. See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/113-3b (1993).
154. ld.; see P eople v. Campbell, 862 N.E. 2d 933,937 (Ill. 2007).
155. utter on file with author.
I 56. Letter on file with author.
157. Letter on file with author.
158. VA. CODE 19.2-160 (2004). Several states have similar statutory provisions. See, e.g.,
ARK. CODE, RULES OF CRIM. PROC., Rule 8.2(b); COLO. REV'D STAT. tit. 16, § 16-5-501; WYO.
STAT. tit. 7, § 7-6-102(a)(v).
I 59. Letter on file with author.
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Use of Convictions in Later Criminal Cases

Nichols v. United States, 160 was one of the many counsel cases
decided by the Supreme Court in the years fo11owing Gideon v.
Wainwright, as noted previously. What was special in Nichols was that the
Justices were confronted with an issue that had divided them in the past,
whether a prior uncounseled misdemeanor conviction-valid under Scott v.
Illinois~ould be used to enhance a sentence in a later, unrelated
prosecution.161
Nichols was convicted of conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to
distribute. 162 In addition to a prior felony drug conviction, a prior
misdemeanor DUI conviction was used to lift his sentence from 168-210
months to 188-235 months. 163 His prior misdemeanor conviction was
uncounseled, and the lower court determined that he had not then waived
his right to counsel. 164 On appeal, the petitioner claimed that the use of his
prior uncounseled misdemeanor conviction violated his 6th Amendment
rights. 165 However, the Supreme Court disagreed. 166 In rendering its
decision, the Justices relied heavily on Scott. 167 They held that prior
uncounseled misdemeanor convictions were valid because they did not
result in prison time at the time and could be used to enhance a later
sentence. 168

160. See Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738 (1994).
161. See id. at 740; see also Balsadar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222, 224 (1980) (when the issue
previously carne before the court, the result was a per curiam opinion voiding later enhancements
based on earlier uncounseled convictions).
162. See Nichols, 511 U.S. at 740.
163. See id.
164. See id. at 741.
165. See id.
166. See id. at 74~9.
167. See id. at 748.
168. See Nichols, 511 U.S. at 748-49.
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Most states have accepted the Court's decision in Nichols, 169 even in
response to state constitutional challenges. Not all states do so, however. 170
Typically, in these cases, the defendants point to serious punishment from
later convictions resulting from earlier uncounseled convictions. 171
Defendants also assert that the prior uncounseled convictions should not be
considered because of their unreliability. 172 Still, most state courts agree
with the rationale expressed in Nichols that enhancement statutes are
commonplace; that the sentencing process is less rigid than the process of
establishing guilt; and that judges are allowed to conduct broad inquiries
and consider a number of factors-including prior criminal history-in
reaching their decisions. 173 Nevertheless, the later convictions can and
169. See State v. Thrasher, 783 So. 2d 103, 106 (Ala. 2000); State v. Brooks, 874 A.2d 280,
286-88 (Conn. 2005); State v. Pressley, 2002 WL 863599, at *1-2 (Del. Super. Ct. Apr. 19,
2002); State v. Keeth, 203 S.W. 3d 718, 727-28 (Mo. 2006); Glaze v. State, 621 S.E. 2d 655,
656-57 (S.C. 2005); State v. Ferguson, Ill P.3d 820, 824-25 (Utah 2005); see also Morris v.
State, 798 A.2d 1042, 1042-43 (DeL 2002); Simmons v. State, 629 S.E.2d 86, 87-8 8 (Ga. 2006);
Williams v. State, 974 P.2d 83, 85 (Idaho 1998); People v. Laskowski, 678 N.E. 2d 124 1, 124445 (Ill. 1997); Morphew v. State, 672 N.E.2d 461, 465-66 (Ind. 1996); State v. Wilkins, 687
N.W. 2d 263, 264-65 (Iowa 2004); State v. Cook, 706 A.2d 603, 606-07 (Me. 1998); People v.
Reichenbach, 459 Mich. 109, 123-24 (Mich. 1998); Ghoston v. State, 645 So. 2d 936, 938-39
(Miss. 1994); State v. Hansen, 273 Mont. 321, 324-26 (Mont. 1995), abrogated by Alabama v.
Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 660 (Mont. 2002); State v. Orduna, No. A-95-284 1995 Neb. App. LEXlS
396, at *7-9 (Neb. Ct. App. Dec. 19, 1995); State v. Sharp, 694 N.E. 2d 1003, 1003...{)4 (Ohio
1994); State v. Skala, 2002-0hio-2962; In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 666 A.2d 813,
814 (R.I. 1995); State v. Sanders, No. M2005-00088-CCA-R3-CD, 2006 Tenn. Crim . App.
LEXIS 506, at *3-5 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 21, 2006); Garcia v. State, 909 S.W. 2d 563, 567
(Tex. 1995); Kapoor v. Conunonwealth, No. 2582-03-4, 2004 Va. App. LEXIS 557 at •2-3 (Va.
App. Nov. 16, 2004);State v. Porter, 671 A.2d 1280, 1281 (Vt. 1996); State v. Schoenick, No. 942536-CR, 1995 Wis. App. LEXIS 296, at *12-13 (Wis. App. Mar. 7, 1995).
170. See, e.g., these cases, relying on their own state constitutional counsel provisions: State
v. Hrycak, 877 A.2d 1209 (N.J. 2005) (emphasizing the unreliability ofuncounseled convictions) ;
State v. Deville, 879 So. 2d 689 (La. 2004) (under Article I, Section 13 of the Louisiana
Constitution, an indigent individual has the right to appointed counsel if he is charged with an
offense punishable by imprisorunent. Because the Louisiana Constitution affords a greater right
to counsel than the Federal Constitution, an individual's prior uncounseled misdemeanor
conviction punishable by imprisonment cannot be used to enhance his sentence or reclassify his
offense.); Brisson v. State, 955 P.2d 888 (Wyo. 1998) (Prior uncounseled convictions could not
be used to "impose or enhance a subsequent prison sentence." The rationale is that prior
uncounseled convictions are unreliable.).
171. See supra note 170.
172. !d.
173. See, e.g., State v . Woodruff, 951 P.2d 605, 606 (N.M. 1997) (stating that with the
enhancement, the maximum amount of jail time the defendant could have received increased
from 90 days to 364 days and he faced a mandatory jail term of not less than 72 hours); State v.
Delacruz, 899 P.2d 1042, 1045 (Kan. 1995) (stating that as a result of the enhancement, the
defendant was sentenced to 40 months' imprisonment with a "post-release supervision period of
24 months." Without the enhancement, the defendant might not have received any imprisonrnent
at all.); State v. Hopkins, 453 S.E. 2d 317, 319 ryi.Va. 1994) (stating that because of the
enhancement, the defendant was sentenced to 1-10 years in prison and he was "fined $500 for the
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often do result in far greater punishment-potentially years in pri·sonbased entirely on the enhancement due to the earlier uncounseled
convictions. 174
3.

Minor cases can be complicated

Argersinger made clear that a judge could not sentence the defendant
to any term of imprisonment unless the defendant had been give the option
of legal representation. 175 The rationale of the Supreme Court in Scott for
drawing the Sixth Amendment line at actual imprisonment is that actual
imprisorunent is a penalty different in kind from fines or the mere threat of
imprisorunent. 176 Presumably, one reason the majority Justices were able to
reach that conclusion is the notion that the minor criminal cases, those not
involving imprisonment, just are not very difficult, and the absence of
counsel would not seriously affect the fairness of the proceeding. 177 Yet, in
the Court's Argersinger opinion, Justice Douglas argued forcefully that it is
the nature of the issues, not the type of punishment involved, which should
determine how important the presence of counsel would be. 178 "[E)ven in
prosecutions for offenses less serious than fejonies, a fair trial may require
the presence of a lawyer." 179
And, Justice Douglas was correct. Law students routinely study
complex and difficult criminal cases in which no imprisonment is ordered
upon conviction. The reader's attention is directed to several ofthese: 180
• Powell v. Texas. 181 A split Supreme Court decides that a
defendant may be convicted when being found in a state of
conviction, $50 as a mandatory penalty, payable to the mercantile establishment, and the costs of
the proceeding;" this was considerably more than would have been possible without the
enhancement).
174. &e, e.g., Burgess v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 1572, 1575-76 (2008) (stating that the
defendant was convicted of a misdemeanor offense in state court and later convicted of an
unrelated federal drug offense). Because the state CQnviction was subject to more than one year's
imprisonment-though classified by the state as a misdemeanor-it co uld be viewed as a "felony
drug offense" for the purpose of imposing a substantial minimum sentence of federal
imprisonment !d. at 1576.
175. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972).
176. See Scott v. lllinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373 (1979). This view was immediately, and
strongly, criticized in Right to Counse l Where Imprisonment is Possible, 93 HARV. L. REV. 82,
86-87 (1979).
177. See Scott, 440 U.S. at 367.
178. See Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 39.
179. See id. at 34.
180. With thanks to these law professors for making excellent suggestions of such cases: John
Douglass, Roger Fairfax, Stuart Green, Susan He!lDan, Sheri Johnson, Wayne Logan, Leo
Romero, and David Wexler.
181. See Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968).
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183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
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191.
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193.
194.
195.
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197.
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199.
200.

171

intoxication in a public place. 182 Defendant was fined $20. 183
Atwater v. City ofLago Vista. 184 The famous soccer mom can
be arrested for a very minor offense [driving without a
seatbelt]. 185 She was fined $50. 186
Scott v. lllinois. 181 A minor shoplifting case, in which the
defendant was fined $50, the very case which decided the
Sixth Amendment limitation. 188
Jacobson v. United States. 189 Upon conviction for receiving
obscene materials through the mails, the defendant was
ordered to serve two years probation and 250 hours of
community service. 190 Major entrapment decision by the
Court.
Staples v. United States. 191 Penalty here was probation and
fine. 192 An important case laying out the state of mind
requirement for a firearms vio1ation. 193
Lawrence v. Texas. 194 After a nolo contendre plea, the trial
court ordered a $200 fine. 195 In a landmark decision, the
Justices struck down an anti-sodomy statute.196
Gall v. United States. 191 The question here was whether a
sentence imposed outside the range suggested by the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines need be justified by extraordinary
circumstances. 198 The defendant was given 36 months
probation for selling ecstacy. 199
Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court of Nevada. 200

See id. at 536.
Seeid. at 517.
See Atwater v. City ofLago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001).
See id. at 354.
See id. at 324.
See Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979).
See id. at 368.
See Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540 (1992).
See id. at 542.
See Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600 (1994).
See id. at 604.
See id. at 619.
See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U .S. 558 ( 2003).
See id. at 563 .
See id. at 578.
See Gall v. United States, 12 8 S. Ct. 586 (2007) .
See id. at 591.
See id. at 592- 93.
See Hiibel v. Sixth Jud. Dist. Ct. ofNev., 542 U .S. 177 (2004).
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Determination that stop and identify statutes do not violate
Fourth or Fifth Amendments. 201 The defendant received a
$250 fine. 202
• United States v. Wen Ho Lee. 203 Scientist at Los Alamos
National Laboratory was accused of being a spy in a widely
reported matter. 204 After a plea bargain to unlawful retention
of national defense information, he received a sentence of
time served while awaiting trial. 205
In each of these cases, a defense lawyer at trial (and prior to it] would
have been absolutely essential to raise, assert, and preserve highly
significant and difficult legal issues. Yet, under the Court' s reasoning in
Scott, no lawyer would be constitutionally required in any ofthem. 206
4.

Collateral Consequences of Convictions

In the American criminal justice system, collateral sanctions207 often
create persistent and lasting obstacles for a convict long after she has
supposedly discharged her debt to society. For felons, these consequences
can severely impinge personal freedoms and civil liberties by causing
exclusion from federal aid programs/08 disqualification from military

201. See id. at 189-91.
202. /d. at 182.
203. See United States v. Wen Ho Lee, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 3082 {l Oth Cir. 2000). The
2000 prosecution is discussed in Neely Tucker, Wen Ho Lee Reporters Held in Contempt, WASH.
POST, Aug. 19, 2004, at A02, available at
http://www. washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A 13508-2004Aug 18.html.
204. See Tucker, supra note 203.
205. See Joshua Micah Marshall, Wen Ho Lee is Free, SALON, Sept. 13, 2000, available at
http://archive.salon.com/news/feature/2000/09/ 13/lee/index.htrnl.
206. See Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373 (1979). In fairness, one should note that under
the later Shelton decision some of the cases- involving suspended sentences- would today
require counsel. Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 674 (2002).
207. See REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES: ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS ON
COLLATERAL SANCTIONS AND DISQUALIFICATION OF CONVICTED PERSONS (2003),
http://www.abanet.org/leadership/recommendations03/ 103A.pdf (stating that the American Bar
Association defmes "collateral sanction" to conviction as a "legal penalty, disability, or
disadvantage, however denominated, that is imposed on a person automatically upon that
person' s conviction for a felony, misdemeanor, or other offense, even if it is n ot included in the
sentence"). See generally JeiUiy Roberts, The Myth of Collateral Consequences of Criminal
Convictions: Involuntary Commitment of "Sexually Violent Predators," 93 MINN. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2009).
208. See 21 U.S.C.A. § 862a ( 1997) (certain drug convictions bar felons from "assistance
under any State program funded under ... the Social Security Act" as well as "benefits under the
food stamps program . . . or any State program carried out under the food Stamp Act of 1977.").
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service/09 and disenfranchisement. 210 Misdemeanor convictions may seem
minor. 211 However, the collateral consequences of such convictions can
also lead to serious repercussions, often outweighing the severity of the
crime and the formal criminal punishment imposed at the original
sentencing. Four such consequences are especially noteworthy.
a.

Employment

Persons convicted of misdemeanors can face grave employment
hurdles that make it difficult to get and keep jobs. This, in turn, creates
substantial barriers since the inability to sustain credible employment often
plays a major role in recidivism. 212 The mere stigma of a conviction-no
matter how trivial the crime may be--complicates the hiring process. 213
Due in part to the advent of speedy internet search engines, and the
popularity and availability of ·private background screening searches/ 14
employers have easy access to information regarding a job applicant's
criminal background. 215 Further, these screening services go virtually

209. See 10 U.S.C.A. § 504 (''No person who ... has been convicted of a felony may be
enlisted in any armed force.").
210. See ACLU Drug Policy Rehabilitation Project, Collateral Consequences of the War on
Drugs, Jan. 2003, at 3, http://www.aclu.org/FilesPDFs/final%20brochure.pdf (noting that, while
felony disenfranchisement laws vary from state to state, only Vermont and Maine have no voting
restrictions for convicted felons).
211. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 19 (2008). In California, for instance, a misdemeanor "is
punishable by imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding six months, or by fine not exceeding
one thousand dollars ($1,000), or by both." !d. That is a fairly typical approach.
212. Margaret Colgate Love, The Debt That Can Never Be Paid, ABA CRIM. JUST., Fall2006,
at 17. For more information regarding the role employment restrictions can play, see Joan
Petersilia, WHEN PRlSONERS COME HOME: PAROLE AND PRlSONER REENTRY {2003) (stating that
prisoners will have a difficult time finding employment after their release); Pierre, Ex-Offenders
Protest Death of Jobs, Services, WASH. POST, July 2, 2008, at B04, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/07/01 rAR2008070 102608_pf.html
(stating that "the unemployment rate for ex-offenders is as high as 50 percent"). This article well
describes the painful application process ex-offenders face. !d.
213. See Avi Brisman, Double Whammy: Collateral Consequences of Conviction and
Imprisonment for Sustainable Communities and the Environment, 28 WM. & MARY ENVT'L L. &
POL'Y REv. 423, 425-42 (2004).
214. See, e.g., Minnesota Criminal Background Check, http://www.mncriminals.com
(advertising "totally free criminal background checks"); see also Abika,
http://www.abika.com/Reports!Freebackgroundchecksandverifications.htm (advertising "Free
Background checks, address checks, court record searches and verifications");
BackgroundCheckGateway,
http://www.backgroundcheckgateway.com/public-records.html (promoting "free instant
background checks"); AAA Infosystems.com,
http://www.aaainfosystems.com (advertising "Background Checks- Free Online Information
Resources").
215. See Love, supra note 212, at 17.
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unregulated, opening more doors for misuse and abuse of criminal history
in the employment process. 216 Federal law does not protect convicted
misdemeanants from employment discrimination, 217 and most states do not
either. Some states do take individual action to limit employment practices
that result· in unfair bias based upon convictions. 218 For example,
Wisconsin219 and New York220 prohibit blanket disqualification of job
applicants based on criminal convictions. 221
Misdemeanor convictions may also have repercussions for
professional licensing. Many licensing applications require full disclosure
of all prior convictions. They often note, though, that misdemeanor
convictions will only be one consideration in the overall decision to grant a
professional license. 222 In some professions, such as law enforcement,
applications set a limit for the degree of misdemeanor that will trigger

216. See id.
217. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a)(l ). Title VII of the U.S. Code is silent on this point. Td.
Consider this:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer ... to fail or refuse to
hire or to discharge any individual, or otheiWise to discriminate against any individual
with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or priv ileges of employment,
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
/d.
218. See Brisman, supra note 213, at 437-40.
219. WIS. STAT. § 111.321 ("[N)o employer, labor organization, employment agency,
licensing agency or other person may engage in any act of employment discrimination . . . against
any individual on the basis of age, race, creed, color, disability, marital status, sex, national
origin, ancestry, arrest record, conviction record ... ").
220. N.Y. CORRECT. LAW§ 752 states:
No application for any license or employment, and no employment or license held by
an individual, to which the provisions of this article are applicable, shall be denied or
acted upon adversely by reason of the individual's having been previously convicted
of one or more criminal offenses, or by reason of a finding of lack of 'good moral
character' when such finding is based upon the fact that the individual has previously
been convicted of one or more criminal offenses.
221. See supra notes 219 and 220 (showing that the statutes in both Wisconsin and New York
allow consideration of criminal background if a substantial relalionship exists between the
conviction and job at issue).
222. See. e.g., Rules for the Virginia Board of Bar Examiners,
http://www.vbbe.state.va.us/pdf7VBBERules.pdf (explaining that, while "commission or
conviction of a crime" may be ground for denial of the right to practice law in the state of
Virginia, the Board considers factors such as "seriousness of the conduct" and "candor of the
applicant in the admissions process"); see Statutes and Regulations: Social Workers, Dep't of
Commerce, Community, and Economics Development, State of Alaska, at 7 (June 2006);
ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 12, § 18.140c, available at
http://www.dced.state.ak.us/occ/pub/SocialWorkStatutes.pdf
{hereinafter
Statutes
and
Regulations) ("The board will, in its discretion, deny an application for a license under AS
08.95.110 if the board fmds that the applicant's history of felony or misdemeanor convictions
make the applicant unfit for the license.").
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denial of a license or disciplinary proceedings for licensed professionals. 223
Sometimes the nature of the crime or conviction must bear a direct
relationship to the particular skills or requirements of the profession to
incur a penalty. 224 For instance, under federal law, doctors may have their
ability to prescribe medications revoked if convicted of "any ... law of the
United States, or of any State, relating to any substance defined ... as a
controlled substance or a list I chemical;"225 also, "a misdemeanor
conviction for possession of burglar's tools bars licensure as a locksmith"
in New York. 226 Therefore, while a hiring or licensing process might not
categorically exclude those convicted of minor crimes, such convictionswholly apart from their sentences-may allow for exclusion. 227 Moreover,
while misdemeanor convictions do not carry the weight of a felony
conviction for professional licensing purposes,228 those convicted of a
misdemeanor may well face an uphill battle when seeking such licensing.

223. See, e.g., Police Officer Supplemental Questionnaire, City of Savage, available,
http:l/www.ci.savage.mn.us!DepartmentsAndServices!Adrninistrarion/documents/PoliceOfficer2007-Supplement.pdf (stating that "[b]eing convicted of a felony or gross misdemeanor in
[Minnesota]" constitutes grounds for discipline of licensed officers); see Procedure for
QualifYing Applicants for Employment as Peace Officers, The University of Texas Systems,
http://www.utsystem.edu/pol/application.htm (applicants may not have been convicted of "any
criminal offense above the grade of Class B misdemeanor or a Class B misdemeanor within the
last ten years from the date of the court order").
224. See, e.g., Misdemeanor/Felony Conviction Form, Michigan State Board of Education,
http://www.umtlint.edu/graduateprograms/documents/MisdemeanorFelonyConvictionForrn.pdf
("Conviction, as an adult, of an act of immoral conduct contributing to the delinquency of a child,
or of a felony involving moral turpitude" may lead to refusal to grant a teach er certification or
revocation or suspension of a previously granted license); see Statutes and Regulations, supra
note 222 (a licensed social worker may be disciplined if he "has been convicted of a felony or has
been convicted of a misdemeanor that reflects on the licensee's abiliry to practice competently
and professionally").
225. 21 U.S.C.A. § 824(a)(2). Thus, a minor drug conviction may adversely impact a licensed
doctor's medical practice if she is prohibited from prescribing or distributing controlled
medications to patients.
226. Legal Action Center, Setting the Record Straight: What DejellSe Attorneys Need to Know
About the Civil Consequences of Client Criminal Records, at 8 (2001),
http://www.hirenetwork.org/pdfslsetting_the_record_straight.pdf.
227. See id.
228. See Gruson, Convict-Turned-Doctor Provoke~- Penl1.lylvunia License Battle, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 8, 1985,
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9501 E6DE I 73BF93BA357 51 C I A963 948260&s
ec=health&spon=&pagewanted=l (a state board in Pennsylvania improperly denied a convictturned-doctor's application for a license to practice medicine based on a misdemeanor, rather than
felony, conviction).
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Education

Misdemeanor convictions can complicate access to educational
opportunities, particularly for those whose convictions involve drug use or
possession. Any student convicted of "any offense under any Federal or
State law involving the possession or sale of a controlled substance for
conduct that occurred during a period of enrollment for which the student
was receiving any grant, loan, or work assistance ..." will not be eligible
to receive future assistance for a period of years determined by the nature
of the conviction.229 Question 35 of the Free Application for Federal
Student Aid ("FAFSA") requires applicants to disclose any prior drug
convictions; 230 applicants who answer in the affirmative or fail to answer at
all will automatically be denied financial aid. 231 Students may resume
eligibility prior to the completion of their suspension through a
rehabilitation program, 232 nonetheless, the ability to finance education
could well be compromised.
It is not simply fundipg for academic activities which is adversely
affected by criminal convictions.
For students with misdemeanor
convictions, gaining admission to institutions of higher learning can pose a
challenge. In the wake of the Virginia Tech shootings, colleges and
universities are now taking a closer look at applicants' criminal records in
an effort to avoid admitting students who might cause trouble at their
institutions. 233 In 2007, the Common Application, an application form used
by approximately 320 schools, was changed to require disclosure of
misdemeanor and felony convictions234 This change was spurred by the
229. 20 U.S.C. § 1091(r)(1) (2008). Possession of controlled substances offenses bars the
person from receiving aid for one year for a first offense, two years for a second offense, and
indeflllitely for a third offense. § 109!(r)(l). Sale of controlled substances offense bars the
person from receiving aid for 2 years for a first offense, and indefinitely for a second offense. §
109l(r)(l). Challenges to the statute have been wholly unsuccessful. See Students for Sensible
Drug Policy Found. v. Spellings, 523 F.3d 896, 899-900 (8th Cir. 2008) (indicating the most
recent example of a futile statutory challenge).
230. See Collateral Consequences ofthe War on Drugs, supra note 21 0, at 1.
231. Id. "Since 2000, 87,637 students have been denied aid under this act." Id.
232. 20 U.S.C. § 1091 (r)(2)(A)(i)-(ii) (2008). The statute provides:
A student whose eligibility has been suspended under paragraph (1) may resume
eligibility before the end of the ineligibility period determined under such paragraph
if ... (A) the student satisfactorily completes a drug rehabilitation program that-(i)
complies with such criteria as the Secretary shall prescribe in regulations for purposes
of this paragraph; and (ii) includes two unannounced drug tests .. . .
§ 1091 (r)(2)(A)(i)-(ii).
233. Marc Fischer, Cho: How'd He Get Into Virginia Tech?, WASH. POST, Apr. 23,2007,
http:/lvoices.washingtonpost.cornlrawfisher/2007/04/cho_howd_he_get_into_virginia.html.
234. See The Common Application Inc., 2008-09 First-Year Application,
https://www.commonapp.org/CommonApp/docs/doMlloadfonns/CommonApp2008.pdf
{last
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realization that when given the choice between using a college's official
application form or the Common Application, students with discipline
problems were using the Common Application because it did not ask about
such conduct. 235
Although there does not seem to be an official policy stating that
misdemeanor convictions will result in the automatic rejection of an
admission candidate, in deciding whether to admit the student, schools
appear to take a hard look at any applicant convicted of a crime.236 With
record numbers of students applying to colleges, 237 admissions officers are
visited Oct. 27, 2008); Laura Pappano, Conduct Unbecoming, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22,2007,
http://www.nytimes.comf2007/04/22/education/pappano.htrnl?partner=permalink&exprod=penna

link.
235. Pappano, supra note 234.
236. This close scrutiny is all too familiar for one-time University of Maryland basketball
recruit Tyree Evans. See Luke Winn, College Basketball, COLLEGE BASKETBALL SPORTS
ILLUSTRATED, June 5, 2006, at 78. Plagued by criminal c harges, Evans had already been denied
the chance to play for at least two universities. See Jeff Barker & Don Markus, Evans Not a Terp

Yet; Maryland Reviewing Admission of Recruit With Troubled Past; Men 's Basketball,
BALTIMORE SUN, May 8, 2008, at 11-Z. Evans eventually pled guilty to two misdemeanors; the
first for marijuana possession and the second for assault and battery. !d. In April 2008, Evans
signed with the Terrapins and was thrilled with the school for "[g]iving [him] a shot . .. ." See
Luke Winn, Maryland Takes a Risk on a Talented Player With a Troubled Past, SPORTS
ILLUSTRATED, May 5, 2008,
http:// sportsillustrated .~nn.comf2 008/writers/luke_ winn/0 5/05/evans.marylandlindex.html.
Though Evans had the full support of the Maryland basketball coach, who intended to mentor
Evans, the recruit could not be admitted to the university without facing a review by the Office of
Student Conduct. See Barker & Markus, supra note 236, at 11-Z. Before the Office of Student
Conduct even considered Evan's convictions, Evans asked for, and was granted, release from his
letter of intent. See Jeff Barker, Evans Won't Attend UM; Terps Accept Controversial Recruit's
Request to be Released From Commitment; Men's Basketball, BALTIMORE SUN, May 24, 2008,
at 3-Z. See generally Eric Prisbell, Troubled Basketball Recruit Evans Won't Play for Terps
After All, WASH. POST, May 24,2008,
http://www. washingtonpost.comfwp-dyn/content/artide/2008/05/23/AR2008052302 745 .html, for
good overviews of the matter. The University of Maryland 's policy is that "All Maryland
applicants, including non[-]athletes, must be reviewed by the Office of Student Discipline if they
have been found guilty of any violation of the law." See Barker, supra note 236, at 3-Z.
237. See Pappano, supra note 234; Nick Perry, University of Washington Rejects a Record
Number ofApplications, SEATTLE TIMES, Mar. 18,2008,
http ://seattletimes.nwsource.comfhtml/education/2004422043_ acceptance 18m.hnnl (reporting
that "[a]pplications are up 12 percent at Washington State University this year and up 7 percent at
Western Washington University. Applications to Seattle University hit 5,000 for the first time,
and just 65 percent of those students were accepted."); Karen W. Arenson, Applications to
Colleges are Breaking Records, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17,2008,
http://www.nytimes.comf2008/0 1117/educationll7admissions.html (stating "Harvard said
Wednesday that it had received a record number of applicants- 27,278- for its next freshman
class, a 19 percent increase over last year. Other campuses reporting double-digit increases
included the University of Chicago (18 percent), Amherst College (17 percent), Northwestern
University (14 percent) and Dartmouth (10 percent)."); California State University, California
Receives Record Number ofApplications for Fall2008, Feb. 1, 2008,
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now looking at criteria beyond just grade point averages and standardized
test scores to determine which applicants will receive acceptance letters.
According to the dean of admissions for Syracuse University, the selection
process "isn't any longer about admitting students who would be successful
and denying those who wouldn't. It is moving into an area of selecting
people who will bring something to your campus and contribute."238 For
students with misdemeanor convictions, this new trend in the admissions
criteria can certainly limit-or seem to limit-the field of potential
colleges.239 One Oregon teenager had a stellar academic record, but also a
conviction for shoplifting a shirt. 240 He wondered if it was even "worth it
to apply[,]" to schools inquiring about criminal misconduct. 241 At the time
he was interviewed, the teen said that he had "only applied to universities
that do not ask about such issues and he [was) hesitant to apply to those
that do."242
The issues raised by minor convictions can also surface later. Indeed,
students convicted of crimes are often surprised to learn that their schools
have policies which support punishment of criminal conduct in addition to
court sanctions,243 even for crimes which did not occur on school
property.244 Student conduct policies often include broad language

http://www.calstate.edu/pa/news/2008/Record_Number_Underg:raduate.shtml (providmg "The
California State University has received a record 515,448 undergraduate applications for fall 2008
admissions as of January 29. This represents an increase of 47,967 applications received to date
from the same time period last year."). As stated in a recent Kansas City newspaper article:
Enrollments have grown at many colleges and universities during the last decade as
baby boomers' children graduated high school, national experts say. But this year
may be a bumper crop for public institutions across the country, with record freslunan
classes predicted from San Diego State University in the west to Virginia Tech in the
east.
See Mara Rose Williams, Freshmen Flock to Univer.~ilies, KANSAS Cnv STAR (Mo.), June 3,
2008, at A-I.
238. Pappano, supra note 234.
239. See Larry Gordon, Does a Pot Bust Trump a 4.0 CPA?, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2007,
http :l/www.latimes.cornlnews/educationlla-me-admit5dec05, I, 165 1158. story?coll=la-ncwsleaming.
240. ld.
241. /d.
242. Id.
243. See, e.g., University of Colorado Office of Judicial Affairs, The Most Frequently Asked
Questions by Students About Judicial Affoirs,
http :l/www.colorado.edu/studentaffairs/judicialaffairs/student-faq.html (last visited Oct. 27,
2007). The University of Colorado website explains to students that being charged in court or
being referred to judicial affairs for additional discipline is not double jeopardy. ld. "As a
student, you are held responsible by the university for your behavior under the Student Conduct
Code, rather than criminal statutes." /d.
244. See, e.g., The University of Virginia, Good Neighbor Guide (2006),
http://www.virginia.edu/comrnunityre lations/off_grounds_guide.pdf (explaining that students
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regarding what degrees of off-campus criminal misconduct will result in
disciplinary action by the school. For example, the Western State College
of Colorado Policy Regarding Off-Campus states:
[A) student's behavior in the larger community may be grounds for
misconduct action, provided that the behavior could have serious
adverse impact on the college community. The College believes that
all students are responsible for obeying federal, state, and municipal
laws; violation of these laws can lead to misconduct action by the
college.245

In order to enforce these policies punishing crimes committed offcampus, schools work with other academic institutions and state agencies
to stay informed of instances of such student misconduct. 246 Going one
step further, some schools require students to report themselves to the
Office of the Dean of Students in the event of "[a]ny arrests or convictions
for violation of federal, state, local, or international law . . . ."241 A
living off campus are still subject to the University Judiciary Committee for any violation of
federal, state, or local law); see also Kara Rowland & Whitney Garrison, Eight Students. Seven
Others Arrested in Drug Bust, THE CAVALIER DAILY, Oct. 6, 2003,
http://www.cavalierdaily.com/news/2003/oct/06/eight-studc;nts-seven-others·arrested-in-drugbust/ (adding that University of Virginia students involved in drug trafficking, if convicted, could
face charges for violating the University's standard code of conduct).
245. See Western State College of Colorado, Institutional Security Policies & Crime Statistics
(2008), http://www.westem.edulstudaff!handbooklcrime~report.html (last visited on Oct. 27,
2008).
246. See, e.g., Virginia Tech, University Policies for Studeru Life§ 3A,
http://www.judicial.vt.edu/upsl.php#jurisdiction; see also Colorado University, Ralphie's Guide
to Student Life ; Safety, http://www.colorado.edu/ralphie/ralphie.cgi?file=s/safety.html (last visited
on Oct. 27, 2008). The Virginia Tech University policy explains:
University detectives coordinate with the district or city attorney's offices for the
filing of criminal charges. Cases involving students also are referred to the Office of
Judicial Affairs for review and possible university sanctions. UPD crime reports
containing information that might affect the security of other university units are
routed to those units and appropriate administrators.
!d.
247. See University ofVirginia, Non-Academic Regulations,
http://records.ureg.virginia.edufcontent.php?catoid=7&page9l8b_non_academic_regulations.htm
I (last visited on Oct. 27, 2008). Other schools have similar self-reporting policies. See
Greenville Technical College Health Science/Nursing Division, Criminal Background Check
Policy (July 14, 2006),
. http://www.gvltec.edu/academics/hcalth_nursing!CRIMINAL_BACKGROUNDCHECK.POLIC
Y0706.pd[ Greenville Technical College in South Carolina requires students in the Healthcare
Science/Nursing Division to "[r]eport within 3 calendar days to the Assistant Dean of Health
Science/Nursing any arrests and/or criminal charges or convictions filed subsequent to the
completion of the crirninal background check. Failure to report will make the student subject to
administrative withdrawal from the program." Jd. Troy University's School of Nursing, in
Alabama, has a similar disclosure policy which requires students to:
[R]eport any arrests or legal convictions including, but not limited to, misdemeanors,
felonies, sexual offender convictions or governmental sanctions .. .. Failure to report
arrests or legal convictions will result in dismissal from the School of Nursing ... .
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student's failure to report an arrest or conviction could lead to further
discipline by the University, should the misconduct come to the attention of
school administrators.248
Student conduct policies allowing for punishment of crimes
committed off-campus are not empty threats. Schools can, and do, sanction
students for these crimes. In a move that garnered much attention, and
ultimately resulted in various lawsuits, the University of Virginia took
action against three students for assaulting another student off campus, in
the Charlottesville area. 249 The three students who all pled guilty or no
contest to criminal charges, were convicted of misdemeanors. 250 After the
court proceedings, the University imposed its own additional sanctions and
suspended all three students (with one student's suspension for two full
years) and required that two of the students complete seventy-five hours of
community service and the other student complete I 00 hours of community
service. m
Not surprisingly, institutions are particularly concerned with
violations of the law involving alcohol and drugs. 252 Here is Virginia
At such tLIDe a nursing student is arrested, the student has 24 hours to report this arrest
to the appropriate Program Director. Failure to report the arrest will result in
automatic dismissal from the School of Nursing.
Troy University College of Health and Human Services, School of Nursing, Disclosure of Legal
Convictions and Arrests (2005),
http://troy.troy.edu/nursing/pdti'BSNorientation.pdf.
At the University of Miami, students
employed as part of the Federal Work Study program have the responsibility to disclose to their
employer any arrests or convictions occurring after their date of hire. See University of Miami
Office of Student Employment, Employment Practices and Procedures Manual,
http://www6.miami.edu!UMH/CDA!UMH_Main/ 0, 1770, 13439-1; 1344 7-2;24490-3,OO.html (last
visited on Oct. 27, 2008). "Upon this disclosure, or if the University discovers an arrest or
conviction has occurred, the employer may take action as it deems necessary to protect the
University community, which may include suspension of the student-employee pending further
review or immediate termination." /d.
248. ld. (indicating that before a review is conducted by the police or University officials,
there may be action taken by the hiring department).
249. See Maria Tor, Judge Throws Out Part ofTigretl Suit, THE CAVALIER DAILY, June 15,
2000, available at http:f/www.cavalierdaily.com/CVArticle.asp?ID=4560&pid=583; Tigrett v.
Rector & Visitors of the Univ. ofVa., 290 F.3d 620,621-22 (4th Cir. 2002).
250. See John Clark, Kory May Sue Smith, Kintz, Tigrett for Personal Injury, THE CAVALIER
DAILY, Nov. 17, 1999, available at
http://www.cavalierdaily.com/CVArticle.asp?ID=2205&pid=506.
One of the students was
sentenced to 12 months in jail with all but 10 days suspended, while the other two received a
sentence of 30 days with all but eight days suspended. Jacqueline Roper, University to Begin
Defense Against Smith Lawsuit Today, THE CAVALIER DAILY, Apr. 25, 2008, available at
http://cavalierdaily.student.virginia.edu/CVArticle.asp?ID=5962&pid=633
(listing
the
suspensions).
25 L See Rector, supra note 249 at 625.
252 . The University of Oklahoma, Student Alcohol Policy,
https:/lwebapps.ou.edulalcohollpolicy.cfin.;
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Tech's policy regarding criminal activity occurring off-campus:
Disciplinary action may be taken by the university for any act
constituting a violation of the law when the act is contrary to the
university's interests as an academic community .... The university
is especially concerned about high-risk consumption of alcohol and
other drug use which threatens the lives, health, safety, and academic
success of our students and has deemed off-campus violations of the
alcoholic beverage and illegal drug policies to be actionable in the
university judicial system. 253

To further its goal of preventing alcohol and drug abuse, Virginia
Tech, punishes, for example, students convicted of driving under the
influence (DUI). 254 Generally, when students with no prior alcohol-related
offenses are convicted of DUI offenses, they are given deferred
suspensions from school and must take part in an "educational experience"
designed to teach the students responsible decision making.255 When
students with prior alcohol-related offenses are convicted of a DUI, they
are typically suspended from Virginia Tech and must take part in an
educational experience upon their return to campus, wholly part from any
punishment from the criminal justice system. 256
For students who are convicted of crimes, the range of sanctions a
[A}ll students who are currently enrolled at the University of Oklahoma or are preenrolled for subsequent semesters and have either attended the institution for at least
one semester in the current or past academic year are responsible for following
federal, state and local laws, the Student Code of Responsibilities and Conduct, and
the Student Alcohol Policy . . . . To curtail alcohol abuse on and off campus, the
university has adopted a mandatory, minimum "3 Strikes" policy. The first alcohol
violation, whether off campus or on campus, automatically will result in appropriate
parent/guardian notification and further alcohol education. A second offense will also
automatically carry parent/guardian notification and an appropriate sanction. A third
violation will result in automatic suspension from the university for a minimum of
one semester.

!d.
253. See Virginia Tech, University Policies for Student Life § 3A,
http://www.judicial.vt.edu/upsl.php; see also Eastern Washington University, Alcohol Policy,
http://www.ewu.edu/x4333.xml, is similar:
The purpose of this policy is to further the university mission by creating a safe
environment for student learning. To accomplish this, the university will support the
enforcement of federal, state, and local laws, as well as its own alcohol and drug
policies and procedures .... Eastern Washington University . . . complies with and
upholds all federal, state, and local laws that regulate or prohibit the possession, use,
or distribution of alcohol. Violations of such laws that come to the attention of
university officials will be addressed within the university or through prosecution in
the courts, or both.
/d.

254. See Virginia Tech, Judicial Affairs, Sanction Information,
http:f/www .judicial. vt.edulsanctionrange.php.
255. See id_
256. See id.
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school can impose on a student is generally vast, from formal warnings to
permanent expulsion. 257
Though penalties such as suspension and
expulsion are particularly disturbing to a student's daily life, any
disciplinary action can affect a student for years to come as he or she
applies to graduate schools and attempts to become a member of a
professional organization. 25s
c.

Housing

The Housing Opportunity Program Extension Act of 1996 gives
public housing authorities the right to access criminal files of an applicant
or tenant, and also records from drug treatment facilities. 259 The purpose of
the law is to assist authorities in deciding whether the applicant is currently
engaging in illegal use of a controlled substance. 260 While this information
must be kept confidential/61 applicants with misdemeanor convictions
could face serious consequences in the housing application process. In
many places, the housing authority has the discretion to deny admission to
applicants if they-or members of family-have been convicted of certain
misdemeanors such as those involving drug use. 262 Federal law is quite
specific, denying applications if:
[A]ny member· of the applicant's household is or was, during a
reasonable time preceding the date when the applicant household
would otherwise be selected for admission, engaged in any drugrelated or violent criminal activity or other criminal activity which
would adversely affect the health, safety, or right to peaceful
enjoyment of the premises by other residents, the owner, or public
housing agency employees. 263

257. See id.
258. See, e.g., William and Mary Law School, Application for Admission,
http://www.law.wm.cdu/law/documents/jd_application07.pdf (asking law school applicants
whether they have been subject to disciplinary action for scholastic or other reasons in any of the
colleges, universities, graduate or professional schools they have attended); see also Virginia
Board of Bar Examiners, Applicant's Character and Fitness Questionnaire 7,
http ://www. vbbe.state. va.us/pdf/LRC&FQuestion.pdf (requiring Virginia State Bar applicantS to
indicate whether they have ever been disciplined by a college, university, or any other post-high
school educational facility).
259. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(s) (2006). The National Crime Information Center, police
departments, and other law enforcement agencies must provide conviction materials for
"purposes of applicant screening, lease enforcement, and eviction." § 1437d {q)( l)(A).
260. See § 1437d (t)(i).
26 1. St?e § 1437d (t)(2).
262. 42 u.s.c. § 13662 (1999).
263. See 42 U.S.C. § l366l(c) (1999). For public housing purposes, "drug-related criminal
activity means the illegal manufacture, sale, distribution, use, or possession with intent to
manufacture, sell, distribute, or use, of a controlled substance." 42 U.S.C. § 1437a(b)(9) (2006).
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Further, once a tenant resides in public housing, a misdemeanor
committed even by others can interfere with the tenant's ability to remain
there. 264 In 2002, the Supreme Court held that local public housing
authorities have the right to terminate tenants whose guests or family
members engage in substance abuse/65 whether or not the tenant knew or
had reason to know about the activity. 266 This "one-strike" policy can lead
to evictions for even minor cases of drug-related activity, as in numerous
instances in which tenants were evicted because family members smoked
marijuana in an apartment complex parking lot.267 Although under
California law, possession of "not more than 28.5 grams of marijuana,
other than concentrated cannabis" constitutes a misdemeanor punishable by
a maximum $100 fine, 268 the relatives of the criminals faced eviction in the
case.269 These harsh penalties exist not only for drug offenses, but for any
other criminal offense that "threatens the health, safety, or right to peaceful
enjoyment of the premises of other tenants", whether the offense occurs on
or off the premises, with or without the tenant's knowledge.m
Once a tenant has been evicted from public housing for a drug-related
crime, including a misdemeanor such as possession of marijuana, she "shall
not be eligible for federally assisted housing during the 3-year period
beginning on the date of such eviction" unless she completes an approved
rehabilitation program. 271 Clearly, misdemeanor crimes can have dire
effects on assisted housing, both presently and in the future, even if the
actual tenant on the property did not commit the crime. 272
264. See 42 U.S.C. § 13662(a)(l) (1999).
265. See Department of Housing and Urban Development v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 115, 136
(2002).
266. See id. The Anti-Drug Abuse Act "'requires lease tenns that give local public housing
authorities the discretion to tenninate the lease of a tenant when a member of the household or a
guest engages in drug-related activity, regardless of whether the tenant knew, or should have
known, of the dmg·rclated activity." Jd.
267. Jd. at 128.
268. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE§ l1357(b) (2008).
269. See Rucker, supra note 265 at 128.
270. 42 u.s.c. § l437d(k) (2006).
271. See 42 U.S.C. § l3661(a) (1999).
272. Other areas are affected too, such as parental rights. See generally N.Y. SOCIAL
SERVICES LAW § 378-a (McKinney 2007) (explaining a misdemeanor conviction may also affect
the parental rights of the offender. In some states, a conviction for any crime of a prospective
foster or adoptive parent--or any individual residing with the prospective parent-may result in a
denial for the foster or adoptive application). Upon a finding of a criminal record for a certified
foster parent, potential adoptive parent, or resident with either, the "authorized agency shall
perfonn a safety assessment of the conditions in the household ... [and) shall thereafter take all
appropriate steps to protect the health and safety of such child or children, including, when
appropriate, the removal of any foster child or c hildren from the home." § 378-a. Although the
authority to deny foster or adoptive applications for misdemeanor convictions is discretionary for
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Immigration Proceedings

Problems for non-U.S. citizens convicted of minor crimes may even
be greater. These people may be removed from the cmmtry, or deemed
"inadmissible" for immigration purposes. 213 The commission of crimes
involving moral turpitude ("CIMT") always renders an alien
inadmissible. 274 An evaluation of moral turpitude does not hinge on the
severity of the crime-or even its punishment-but rather the intent of the
criminal in committing the offense. 275 A crime involving specific intent,
such as larceny,276 constitutes a CTMT; however, in some cases,
aggravating factors may elevate a non·CIMT to a CIMT. 277 Moral
turpitude is determined by the statutory definition of the crime and not the
facts underlying the conviction.278
There are two important exceptions to removability due to
commission of a CIMT. First, if the individual committed the CIMT while
the authorized agency, nonetheless a misdemeanor conviction may expose potential parents to
serious familial repercussions. See§ 378-a 2(h).
273. See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182 (2)(A)(l) (showing that Under the Immigration and Nationality
Act § 240, conviction includes a "formal judgment of guilt of the alien entered by a court" or any
adjudication in which "a judge or jury has found the alien guilty[,] . . . the alien has entered a plea
of guilty or nolo contendere[,] or [the alien] has admitted sufficient facts to warrant a fmding of
guilt" and "some form of punishment, penalty, or restraint on the alien's liberty" has been
imposed). Preston, Perfectly Legal Immigrants, Until They Applied for Citizenship, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 12, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/12/us/12naturalize.html?hp
(showing the strikingly more severe consequences here being seen in recent years). She recounts
the story of one legal immigrant-an electrical engineer living in the U.S. for almost two
decades-who "discovered that a 10-year-old conviction for domestic violence involving a
former girlfriend, even though it had been reduced to a misdemeanor and erased from his public
record, made him ineligible to become a citizen--or even to continue living in the United States."

!d.
274. See 8 U.S.C.A. § ll82(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) . This includes convictions ofCIMTs, admission to
convictions of CIMTs, as well as commission of acts which have the same "essential elements" of
a CIMT. [d. The definition does not extend, however, to "purely political offense[s]." ld. See
generally Vargas-Padilla, immigration Consequences of Criminal Conduct, III CRIM. L AW BRIEF
(American University 2007), at 24, available at
http://www. wcl.american.edu/joumal/clb/issues.cfin.
275. See id.
276. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, 9 FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL NOTES 40.2 l(A) N2. MORAL
TURPITUDE (2005) [hereinafter F AM], available at
http://www.state.gov/docurnents/organization/86942.pdf.
277. See Vargas-Padilla, supra note 274, at 26 ("assault and battery with a deadly weapon has
long been deemed a crime involving moral turpitude, because the knowing or attempted use of
deadly force is deemed an act of moral depravity that takes the offense outside the 'simple assault
and battery' categoJY.").
278. See FAM, supra note 276. This "categorical approach" allows for the divisibility o f the
statute of conviction provided that the statute combines both CIMTs and non-CIMTs in a single
code section. See also Vargas-Padilla, supra note 274 (depicting the process of removal and
conviction).
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underage, it will not be used to remove him. 279 Second, if the crime is
deemed a "petty offense," then it will not serve as a basis for removal. 280 A
"petty offense" means the potential imprisonment for a conviction does not
exceed one year and the actual sentence imposed does not exceed six
months. 281 However, any conviction "relating to a controlled substance"
renders an alien automatically inadmissible regardless of sentence.282 The
statute broadly encompasses a wide array of drug offenses and
convictions. 283 The statutory exception excludes convictions for "a single
offense involving possession for one's own use of 30 grams or less of
marijuana."284
Courts generally construe this exception narrowly. 285
Aggravated felony convictions also serve as a means for deportability or
removal, which can include misdemeanor convictions analogous to federal
felonies-enumerated in 18 U.S.C.A. § 924(c)(2}-under drug trafficking
laws. 286 However, the state drug conviction must be punishable as a federal
Therefore, some misdemeanor
felony to substantiate removal. 287
convictions may not qualify? 88
279. See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(ii)(I). The automatic C!MT exclusion does not apply if:
(T]he crime was commined when the alien was under 18 yeal'l> of age, and the crime
was committed (and the alien released from any confinement to a prison or
correctional institution imposed for the crime) more than 5 years before the date of
application for a visa or other documentation and the date of application for admission
to the United States.
§ 1182(a)(2)(A)(ii)(I).
280. See Vargas-Pad.illa, supra note 274, at 26.
281. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(ii)(II). The automatic CIMT exclusion does not apply if:
[t]he maximum penalty possible for the crime of which the alien was convicted (or
which the alien admits having committed or of which the acts that the alien admits
having committed constituted the essential elements) did not exceed imprisonment for
one year and, if the alien was convicted of such crime, the alien was not sentenced to
a term of imprisonment in excess of 6 months (regardless of the extent to which the
sentence was ultimately executed).
§ 1182(a){2)(A)(ii)(II).
282. See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(a)(2){A)(i)(II),
283. See, e.g., Matter of Hernandez-Ponce, 19 I&N Dec. 613 (BIA 1988) (stating that
respondent was deportable for two convictions for use of phencyclidine, commonly known as
"PCP").
284. See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i).
285. See, e.g., Matter of Moncada-Servellon, 24 I&N Dec. 62, 62-68 (BIA 2007) (finding that
the exception did not apply to an alien "convicted under a statute that has an element requiring
that possession of the marijuana be in a prison or other correctional setting").
286. See Vargas-Padilla, supra note 274, at 26.
287. See Lopez v. Gonzales, 549 U.S. 47, 51 (2006) (finding that, since the defendant's state
offense would not be punishable under the federal system, it would not be a sufficient basis for
removal).
28 8. Many defendants have raised the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel with cases in
which the defense attorney failed to warn of potentially serious immigration consequences
resulting from pleas to even minor charges. These claims have not been successful. See United
States v. Fry, 322 F.3d 1198, 1200 (9'h Cir. 2003) (stating that most courts conclude that
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This chart, prepared by my colleague, Angela Banks, may be useful in
seeing the range of offenses subject to sanction.
INADMISSIBLE
GROUNDS

DEPORTABLE
GROUNDS

Crimes involving
moral turpitude
(CIMT)

INA§ 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I)
Conviction of, admission
of, or admission of acts
constituting a crime
involving moral
turpitude

INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(i)
Conviction of a crime
involving moral
turpitude within 5 years
after the date of
admission & sentence
of one year or more
may be imposed.

CIMTyouth
exception

INA § 212(a)(2)(A)(ii)(I)

CIMT petty offense
exception

INA§
212(a)(2)(A)(ii)(Il)

Controlled substance

INA§ 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(II)
Conviction of, admission
of, or admission of acts
constituting a violation
of any law or regulation
of the U.S. or foreign
country relating to a
controlled substance

INA§ 237(a)(2)(B)(i)
Conviction of a
violation of State, U.S.,
or foreign laws relating
to a controlled
substance

30 gram exception
for controlled
substances

INA § 237(a)(2)(B)(i)

Aggravated felony
conviction

INA§ 237(a)(2)(A)(iii)
"Any alien who is
convicted of an

"deportation is a collateral consequence of the criminal process and hence the failure to advise
does not amount to ineffective assistance of counsel"); see also Broomes v. Ashcroft, 358 F. 3d
1251 , 1254 (10 1~ Cir. 2004) (claim of effective assistance of counsel was denied); State v.
Paredez, 101 P.3d 799, 802 (N.M. 2004) (depicting that the "trial court had no obligation to
inform defendant of specific consequences of guilty plea").

THE SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO COUNSEL

2009]

I B7

aggravated felony at
any time after
admission is
deportable."
Aggravated felony
defined

*

*

*

INA§ 10l(a)(43)

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

In the several areas noted above, misdemeanor convictions can cause
serious collateral consequences for defendants even when unaccompanied
at that time by a substantial penalty such as jail time. Recognizing the
severity and unfairness of these collateral consequences, the American Bar
Association has attempted to persuade lawmakers to limit col1ateral
sanctions that significantly infringe on individual liberties and rights. 289
Such limitations include forbidding "deprivation of legally recognized
domestic relationships and rights other than in accordance with rules
applicable to the general public," 290 "ineligibility to participate in
government programs providing necessities of life, including food,
clothing, housing, medical care, disability pay, and Social Security... ,"291
and "ineligibility for governmental benefits relevant to successful reentry
into society, such as educational and job training programs."292
VI. CONCLUSION
It can be vitally important for a poor criminal defendant to have the
aid of a trained lawyer at a criminal trial, even a trial involving the
likelihood of little or no serious punishment upon conviction. The
Supreme Court's limitation of the constitutional right to cases in which
imprisonment is actually to be imposed made little sense thirty years ago,
and it makes even less sense today, as more states than ever recognize the
ongoing problems and do give such legal aid even in minor misdemeanor
prosecutions.

289. See ABA STANDARDS fOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE ON COLLATERAL SANCTIONS AND
DISQUALIFlCATION OF CONVlCfED PERSONS (3d ed. 2003),
www.abanet.org/leadership/recommendations03/l 03A.pdf.
290. !d. at STANDARD !9-2.6(c)(i). Conviction alone:
[S)hould be insufficient to deprive a person of the right to contract or dissolve a
marriage; parental rights, including the right to direct the rearing of children and to
live with children except during actual confinement; the right to grant or withhold
consent to the adoption of children; and the right to adopt children . ...
!d.
291. rd. at STANDARD 19-2.6(e).
292. !d. at STANDARD !9-2.6(f).

188

ST. THOMAS LAW REVIEW

[Vol.2 l

Justice Powell, in Argersinger, acknowledged that even minor
misdemeanor prosecutions might wel1 require appointed defense counsel. 293
For him, it was to be a case-by-case determination, not wholly dissimilar
from that utilized in the deservedly discredited Betts v. Brady special
circumstances opinion.294
I would hold that the right to counsel in petty offense cases is not
absolute but is one to be detennined by the trial courts exercising a
judicial discretion on a case-by-case basis. The detennination should
be made before the accused fonnally pleads [and should be based on
three considerations]: First, the court should consider the complexity
of the offense charged. Second, the court should consider the probable
sentence that will follow if a conviction is obtained. The more serious
the likely consequence, the greater is the probability that a lawyer
should be appointed. Third, the court should consider the individual
factors peculiar to each case. These, of course, would be the most
difficult to anticipate. 295

No other Justice joined with him there, and for good reason. These
determinations by a trial judge would be exceedingly difficult to make
fairly after a trial. Before a trial, they would be just about impossible to
make with so little known to the judge about the defendant, the nature of
the case, and the likely punishment. This, of course, is what doomed the
special circumstances test decades earlier. 296
Some commentators have argued that critics here should become
realistic. State budgets in this area are not likely to expand much, if at all,
as a practical matter. Our current system, let alone an extension of the
counsel right, deprives some defendants in need of real legal aid while it
gives assistance to those not very much in need. The suggestion here is
that to comply with Argersinger, states should take actions to be certain
that truly minor offenses no longer have the possibility of imprisonment,
thereby eliminating the counsel mandate. One astute observer put the
matter in this way:

293. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 27,31 (1972).
294. !d. at 27.
295. See Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 63-{i4.
296. !d. at 53. Justice Powell himself seemed to recognize the difficulty here:
If counsel is not appointed or knowingly waived, no sentence of imprisorunent for any
duration may be imposed. The judge will therefore be forced to decide in advance of
trial-and without hearing the evidence-whether he will forgo entirely his judicial
discretion to impose some sentence of imprisonment and abandon his responsibility to
consider the full range of punishments established by the legislature. His altemati ves,
assuming the availability of counsel, will be to appoint counsel and retain the
discretion vested in him by law, or to abandon this discretion in advance and proceed
without counsel.

!d.
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[l]t makes sense to reallocate resources that otherwise would be spent
in support of counsel in those cases by eliminating such cases from the
caseloads of indigent defense counsel, thereby redirecting such
resources to the support of cases in which the stakes are higher and the
impact of counsel appears to be greater?97

This position is intriguing, and clearly more workable than that
suggested earlier by Justice Powell. For me, however, it is not acceptable
for two reasons. First, in my view, Scott was wrongly decided and the
Constitution truly does mandate counsel in all criminal cases. Second,
there are good reasons to impose the counsel requirement in all criminal
cases, as indicated above. Even minor cases may become major in later
years, and may carry dire collateral consequences. Defendants in those
cases need the guiding hand of trained defense counsel.
The United States Supreme Court made some bold and highly
significant judgments regarding the right to an attorney for indigents in
criminal prosecutions. The decision to limit that right to cases with an
imprisonment requirement was surely not one of them. The Court should
revisit the matter and decide that indigent defendants should be given
appointed counsel in all criminal cases, not just in some criminal cases.

297. Hashimoto, supra note 87, at 496.

